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Abstract
We present a logic for Proximity-based Understanding of Conditionals (PUC-Logic) that unifies the Counter-
factual and Deontic logics proposed by David Lewis. We also propose a natural deduction system (PUC-ND)
associated to this new logic. This inference system is proven to be sound, complete, normalizing and deci-
dable. The relative completeness for the V and CO logics is shown to emphasize the unified approach over
the work of Lewis.
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1. Counterfactuals
• If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, then someone else did.
• If Oswald had not killed Kennedy, then someone else would have.[1]
The phrases above are respectively instances of the indicative and the subjunctive conditionals. The
indicative conditional is associated to the material implication, whereas the subjunctive construction of the
language is traditionally studied by the philosophy as the counterfactual conditional[1, 3] or the counterfac-
tual for short.
Conditional propositions involve two components, the antecedent and the consequent. Counterfactual
conditionals differ from material implication in a subtle way. The truth of a material implication is based
on the actual state-of-affairs. From the knowledge that Kennedy was killed, we can accept the truth of the
phrase. On the other hand, a counterfactual conditional should take into account the truth of the antecedent,
even if it is not the case. The truth of the antecedent is mandatory in this analysis.
Some approaches to counterfactuals entail belief revision, particularly those based on Ramsey test eval-
uation [11]. In this analysis, the truth value of a counterfactual is considered within a minimal change
generated by admitting the antecedent true[3].
A possible way to circumvent belief revision mechanisms is to consider alternative (possible) state-of-
affairs, considered here as worlds, and, based on some accessibility notion, choose the closest one among the
worlds that satisfy the antecedent. If the consequent is true at this considered world, then the counterfactual
is also true[1].
Both conditionals have false antecedents and false consequents in the current state-of-affairs. However,
the second conditional is clearly false, since we found no reason to accept that, in the closest worlds in which
Kennedy is not killed by Oswald, Kennedy is killed by someone else.
1Thanks to PUC-Rio for the VRac sponsor. Thanks to DAAD (Germany) for the Specialist Literature Programme.
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We choose the approach of Lewis[1] in our attempt to formalize an inference system for counterfactuals
because his accessibility relation leaves out the discussion for a general definition of similitude among worlds,
which is considered as given in his analysis.
It also opened the possibility for a contribution in the other way. If we found some general properties
in his accessibility relation, considering the evaluation of the formulas in the counterfactual reasoning, we
could sketch some details of the concepts of similitude.
2. Lewis analysis
Lewis, in the very first page of his book[1]:
”If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over, seems to me to mean something like this: in
any possible state of affairs in which kangaroos have no tails, and which resembles our actual
state of affairs as much as kangaroos having no tails permits it to, the kangaroos topple over.”
We can observe that the word “resemble” may be seen as a reference to the concept of similarity between
some possible state of affairs in relation to the actual state of affairs. The expression “as much as” here may
be understood as a relative comparison of similarities among the possible states of affairs in relation to the
actual state of affairs. But Lewis gave no formal definition of similarity in his book[1].
He defined two basic counterfactual conditional operators:
• A B: If it were the case that A, then it would be the case that B;
• A B: If it were the case that A, then it might be the case that B.
And provided also the definition of other counterfactual operators. But, since they are interdefinable, he
took as the primitive for the construction of formulas.
In the middle of his book, he introduced the comparative possibility operators and showed that they can
serve as the primitive notion for counterfactuals.
• A 4 B: It is as possible that A as it is that B.
This operator gave us simpler proofs during this work.
He used possible-world semantics for intentional logic. For that reason the state of affairs are treated as
worlds. To express similarity, he used proximity notions: a world is closer to the actual world in comparison
to other worlds if it is more similar to the actual world than other considered worlds.
Lewis called the set of worlds to be considered for an evaluation as the strictness of the conditional. He
pointed out that the strictness of the counterfactual conditional is based on the similarity of worlds. He
showed that the counterfactual could not be treated by strict conditionals, necessity operators or possibility
operators given by modal logics. To do so, he argued that strictness of the conditional can not be given
before all evaluations. He constructed sequences of connected counterfactuals in a single English sentence
for which the strictness cannot be given for the evaluation:
”If Otto had come, it would have been a lively party; but if both Otto and Anna had come it
would have been a dreary party; but if Waldo had come as well, it would have been lively; but...”
to show that the strictness of the counterfactuals cannot be defined by the context, because the sentence
provides a single context for the evaluation of all counterfactuals. If we try to fix a strictness that makes a
counterfactual true, then the next counterfactual is made false.
Lewis proposed a variably strict conditional, in which different degrees of strictness is given for every
world before the evaluation of any counterfactual. To express this concept, the accessibility relation is
defined by a system of spheres, which is given for every world by a nesting function $ that applies over a set
of worlds W. The nested function attributes a set of non-empty sets of worlds for each world and this set
of sets is in total order for the inclusion relation.
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Figure 1: A system of spheres around some world i
A systems of spheres, of any kind, is central in the most traditional analysis of counterfactuals. But the
idea behind it is also available to many different logics. So, if we manage to handle them in a satisfactory
manner, we will be able to use it in a broader class of logics. The system of neighbourhoods facilitates the
development of the model, by leaving open the choice for a proper definition of similarity. And that concept
can be used for a broader class of logics, not only the counterfactuals.
From Lewis definitions, the nesting function is a primitive notion:
φ ψ is true at a world i (according to a system of spheres $) if and only if either: no φ-world
belongs to any sphere S in $i
2, or some sphere S in $i does contains at least one φ-world, and
φ→ ψ holds at every world in S.
φ 4 ψ is true at a world i (according to a system of spheres $) if and only if, for every sphere S
in $i, if S contains any ψ-world then S contains a φ-world.
Lewis[1] also provided conditions that may be applied to the nesting function $. To every condition
corresponds a different counterfactual logic:
• Normality (N): $ is normal iff ∀w ∈ W : $(w) 6= ∅;
• Total reflexivity (T): $ is totally reflexive iff ∀w ∈ W : w ∈ ⋃ $(w);
• Weak centering (W): $ is weakly centered iff ∀w ∈ W : $(w) 6= ∅ and ∀N ∈ $(w) : w ∈ N ;
• Centering (C): $ is centered iff ∀w ∈ W : {w} ∈ $(w);
• Limit Assumption (L): $ satisfies the Limit Assumption iff, for any world w and any formula φ, if
there is some φ-world3 in
⋃
$(w), then there is some smallest sphere of $(w) that contains a φ-world;
• Stalnaker’s Assumption (A): $ satisfies Stalnaker’s Assumption iff, for any world w and any formula
φ, if there is some φ-world in
⋃
$(w), then there is some sphere of $(w) that contains exactly one
φ-world;
• Local Uniformity (U-): $ is locally uniform iff for any world w and any v ∈ ⋃ $(w), ⋃ $(w) and ⋃ $(v)
are the same;
• Uniformity (U): $ is uniform iff for any worlds w and v,
⋃
$(w) and
⋃
$(v) are the same;
• Local absoluteness (A-): $ is locally absolute iff for any world w and any v ∈ ⋃ $(w), $(w) and $(v)
are the same;
2$i gives the neighbourhoods around the world i. They are the available strictness to evaluate counterfactuals at i.
3A φ-world is a world in which φ holds.
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• Absoluteness (A): $ is absolute iff for any worlds w and v, $(w) and $(v) are the same.
The V -logic is the most basic counterfactual logic presented by Lewis[1], where “V” stands for variably
strict conditional. If, for example, we accept the centering condition (C), then we have the V C-logic. Lewis
showed in his book a chart of 26 non-equivalent V -logics that arises from the combinations of the conditions.
We prefer to call the spheres as neighbourhoods, because they represent better the concept of proximity,
which Lewis used to express similarity. The neighbourhoods provide a relative way to compare distance.
The world that is contained in a neighbourhood is closer to the actual world than other world that is not
contained in that same neighbourhood.
As far as we know, there is only one natural deduction system for the counterfactuals, which is given
by Bonevac [13]. But his system is designed to deals with the VW -logic, since it contains the rule of
counterfactual exploitation (E), which encapsulates the weak centering condition. His approach to define
rules for the counterfactual operators provides a better intuition of the counterfactual logic. His systems
is expressive enough to deal with modalities and strict conditionals. The labelling of world shifts using
formulas make easier to capture the counterfactual mechanics.
We also found the work of Sano [14] which pointed out the advantages of using the hybrid formalism for
the counterfactual logic. He presented some axioms and rules for the VHC(@)-logic that extends the V -logic
of Lewis.
Another interesting reference is the article of Gent[12], which presents a new sequent- or tableaux-style
proof system for V C. His work depends on the operator JK and the definition of signed formulas.
We recently found a sequent calculus, provided by Lellmann[25], that treats the V -logic of Lewis and
its extensions. Its language depends on modal operators, specially the counterfactual operators and
and the comparative possibility operator 4.
As far as we know, our deduction system is the only one dealing with Lewis systems in a general form,
that is, without using modalities in the syntax and treating the most basic counterfactual V -logic.
3. Proximity-based Understanding of Conditionals
In [17], we presented a sequent calculus for counterfactual logic based on a Local Set Theory [4]. In this
article, we defined the satisfaction relation for worlds, for sets of the worlds and for neighbourhoods, where
we encapsulated some quantifications that made it easier to express the operators with fewer quantifiers.
But the encapsulation made the the inference system to have no control of the quantifications. Here we
propose a logic for Proximity-based Understanding of Conditionals, PUC-Logic for short, that take control
of the quantifications with labels.
Definition 1. Given a non-empty set W (considered the set of worlds), we define a nesting function $ that
assigns to each world of W a set of nested sets of W. A set of nested sets is a set of sets in which the
inclusion relation among sets is a total order.
Definition 2. A frame is a tuple F = 〈W, $,V〉, in which V is a truth assignment function for each atomic
formula with image on the subsets of W. A model is a pair M = 〈F , χ〉, F a frame and χ a world of W,
called the reference world of the model. A template is a pair T = 〈M, N〉, N ∈ $(χ) and N is called the
reference neighbourhood of the template.
We use the term structure to refer a model or a template.
Definition 3. A structure is finite if its set of worlds is finite.
We now define a relation between structures to represent the pertinence of neighbourhoods in a neigh-
bourhood system of a world and the pertinence of worlds in a given neighbourhood.
Definition 4. Given a model M = 〈W, $,V, χ〉, then, for any N ∈ $(χ), the template T = 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉
is in perspective relation toM. We represent this byM( T . Given a template T = 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉, then,
for any w ∈ N , the model M = 〈W, $,V, w〉 is in perspective relation to T . We represent this by T (M.
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Definition 5. The concatenation of n tuples of the perspective relation is called a path of size n and is
represented by the symbol (n.
One remark: if the size of a path is even, then a model is related to another model or a template is
related to another template.
Definition 6. The transitive closure of the perspective relation is called the projective relation, which is
represented by the symbol ;.
Definition 7. Given a world χ and the nested neighbourhood function $ we can build a sequence of sets
of worlds:
1.
a$
0(χ) = {χ};
2.
a$
k+1(χ) =
⋃
w∈a$k(χ)(⋃ $(w)), k ≥ 0.
Let
a$
(χ) =
⋃
n∈N
a$
n(χ) and
a$
~n(χ) =
⋃
0≤m≤n
a$
m(χ).
We introduce labels in our language, in order to syntactically represent quantifications over two specific
domains: neighbourhoods and worlds. So, for that reason, a label may be a neighbourhood label or a world
label:
• Neighbourhood labels:
(~) Universal quantifier over neighbourhoods of some neighbourhood system;
(}) Existential quantifier over neighbourhoods of some neighbourhood system;
(N) Variables (capital letters) that may denote some neighbourhood of some neighbourhood system.
• World labels:
(∗) Universal quantifier over worlds of some neighbourhood;
(•) Existential quantifier over worlds of some neighbourhood;
(u) Variables (lower case letters) that denote some world of some neighbourhood.
We denote the set of neighbourhood labels by Ln and the set of world labels by Lw.
Definition 8. The language of PUC-Logic consists of:
• countably neighbourhood variables: N,M,L, . . .;
• countably world variables: w, z, . . .;
• countably proposition symbols: p0, p1, . . .;
• countably proposition constants: >n,⊥n,>w,⊥w, ˆN, ´N, ˆM, ´M, . . .;
• connectives: ∧,∨,→,¬;
• neighbourhood labels: ~,};
• world labels: ∗, •;
• auxiliary symbols: (, ).
As in the case of labels, we want to separate the sets of well-formed formulas into two disjoint sets,
according to sort of label that labels the formula. We denote the set of neighbourhood formulas by F n and
the set of world formulas by Fw.
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Definition 9. The sets F n and Fw of well-formed formulas
4 are constructed the following rules:
1. >n,⊥n ∈ F n;
2. >w,⊥w ∈ Fw;
3. ˆN, ´N ∈ Fw, for every neighbourhood variable N ;
4. α ∈ F n, for every atomic formula α, except > and ⊥;
5. if α ∈ F n, then ¬α ∈ F n;
6. if α ∈ Fw, then ¬α ∈ Fw;
7. if α, β ∈ F n, then α ∧ β, α ∨ β, α→ β ∈ F n;
8. if α, β ∈ Fw, then α ∧ β, α ∨ β, α→ β ∈ Fw;
9. if α ∈ F n and φ ∈ Lw, then αφ ∈ Fw;
10. if α ∈ Fw and φ ∈ Ln, then αφ ∈ F n.
We introduced the two formulas for true and false, in order to make the sets of formulas disjoint. The
formula ˆN is introduced to represent that a neighbourhood contains the neighbourhood N and the formula
´N represent a neighbourhood is contained in N .
The last two rules of definition 9 introduces the labelling the formulas. Moreover, since we can label a
labelled formula, every formula has a stack of labels that represent nested labels. We call it the attribute of
the formula. The top label of the stack is the index of the formula. We represent the attribute of a formula
as a letter that appear to the right of the formula. If the attribute is empty, we may omit it and the formula
has no index. The attribute of some formula will always be empty if the last rule, used to build the formula,
is not one of the labelling rules, as in the case of ((α→ α)~,•) ∨ (γ},∗).
To read a labelled formula, it is necessary to read its index first and then the rest of the formula. For
example, (α → α)~,• should be read as: there is some world, in all neighbourhoods of the considered
neighbourhood system, in which it is the case that α→ α.
We may concatenate stacks of labels and labels, using commas, to produce a stack of labels that is
obtained by respecting the order of the labels in the stacks and the order of the concatenation, like αΣ,∆,
where α is a formula and Σ and ∆ are stacks of labels. But we admit no nesting of attributes, which means
that (αΣ)∆ is the same as αΣ,∆.
Definition 10. Given a stack of labels Σ, we define Σ as the stack of labels that is obtained from Σ by
reversing the order of the labels in the stack.
Definition 11. Given a stack of labels Σ, the size s(Σ) is its number of labels.
Definition 12. Given a set of worlds W, a set of world variables and a set of neighbourhood variables, we
define a variable assignment function σ, that assigns a world of W to each world variable and a non-empty
set of W to each neighbourhood variable.
Definition 13. Given a variable assignment function σ, the relation |= of satisfaction between formulas,
models and templates is given by:
1. 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= α, α atomic, iff: χ ∈ V(α). For every world w ∈ W, w ∈ V(>n) and w 6∈ V(⊥n);
2. 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= ¬ (αΣ) iff: ¬ (αΣ) ∈ F n and 〈W, $,V, χ〉 6|= αΣ;
4We use the term wff to denote both the singular and the plural form of the expression well-formed formula.
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3. 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= αΣ ∧ βΩ iff: αΣ ∧ βΩ ∈ F n and
( 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= αΣ and 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= βΩ;
4. 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= αΣ ∨ βΩ ) iff: αΣ ∨ βΩ ∈ F n and
( 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= αΣ or 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= βΩ );
5. 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= αΣ → βΩ iff: αΣ → βΩ ∈ F n and
( 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= ¬(αΣ) or 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= βΩ );
6. 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= αΣ,~ iff: ∀N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ;
7. 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= αΣ,} iff: ∃N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ;
8. 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= αΣ,N iff: 〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= αΣ;
9. 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= ˆM iff: σ(M) ∈ $(χ) and σ(M) ⊂ N ;
10. 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= ´M iff: σ(M) ∈ $(χ) and N ⊂ σ(M);
11. 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ,∗ iff: ∀w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= αΣ;
12. 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ,• iff: ∃w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= αΣ;
13. 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ,u iff: σ(u) ∈ N and 〈W, $,V, σ(u)〉 |= αΣ;
14. 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= ¬ (αΣ) iff: ¬ (αΣ) ∈ Fw and 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 6|= αΣ;
15. 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ ∧ βΩ iff: αΣ ∧ βΩ ∈ Fw and
( 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ and 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= βΩ );
16. 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ ∨ βΩ iff: αΣ ∨ βΩ ∈ Fw and
( 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ or 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= βΩ );
17. 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ → βΩ iff: αΣ → βΩ ∈ Fw and
( 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= ¬(αΣ) or 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= βΩ );
18. 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= >w and 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 6|= ⊥w, for every template.
Definition 14. The relation αΣ |= βΩ of logical consequence is defined iff αΣ, βΩ ∈ F n and for all model
M |= αΣ, we have M |= βΩ. The relation is also defined iff αΣ, βΩ ∈ Fw and for all template T |= αΣ, we
have T |= βΩ. Given Γ ∪ {αΣ} ⊂ F n, the relation Γ |= αΣ of logical consequence is defined iff for all model
M that satisfies every formula of Γ, M |= αΣ. Given Γ ∪ {αΣ} ⊂ Fw, the relation Γ |= αΣ is defined iff for
all templates T that satisfies every formula of Γ, T |= αΣ.
Definition 15. αΣ ∈ F n (∈ Fw) is a n-tautology (w-tautology) iff for every model (template) M |= αΣ
(T |= αΣ).
Lemma 1. αΣ is a n-tautology iff αΣ,∗,~ is a n-tautology.
Proof. If αΣ is a n-tautology, ∀z ∈ W, 〈W, $,V, z〉 |= αΣ. In particular, given a world χ ∈ W, ∀N ∈ $(χ) :
∀w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= αΣ and, by definition, 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= αΣ,∗,~ for every world of W and αΣ,∗,~ is
also a n-tautology. Conversely, if αΣ,∗,~ is a n-tautology, then ∀N ∈ $(χ) : ∀w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= αΣ for
every choice of W , $ , V and w. So, given W , V and w, we can choose $ to be the constant function {W}.
So, ∀z ∈ W, 〈W, $,V, z〉 |= αΣ and αΣ must also be a n-tautology.
The relation defined below is motivated by the fact that, if a modelM satisfies a formula like α~,∗, then
for every template T , such that M ( T , T satisfies α~ by definition. And also for every model H, such
that M(2 H, H satisfies α by definition.
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Definition 16. Given a model M, called the reference model, the relation αΣ |=M:n βΩ of referential
consequence is defined iff:
• n > 0 and (M |= αΣ implies H |= βΩ, for any structure M(n H);
• n = 0 and (if M |= αΣ implies M |= βΩ).
Given Γ ∪ {αΣ} ⊂ F n, Γ |=M:n αΣ iff:
• n > 0 and (H |= αΣ, for any structure M(n H that satisfies every formula of Γ);
• n = 0 and (M |= αΣ if M satisfies every formula of Γ).
Every rule of PUC-ND has a stack of labels, called its context. The scope is represented by a capital
Greek letter at the right of each rule. The scope of a rule is the top label of its context. Given a context
∆, we denote its scope by !∆. If the context is empty, then there is no scope. As in the case of labels and
formulas, we want to separate the contexts into two disjoint sets: ∆ ∈ Cn if !∆ ∈ Ln; ∆ ∈ Cw if ∆ is empty
or !∆ ∈ Lw.
Definition 17. We say that a wff αΣ fits into a context ∆ iff αΣ,∆ ∈ F n.
The wff α• → β• and γu,~,∗ fit into the context {}}, because (α• → β•)} ∈ F n and γu,~,∗,} ∈ F n.
The wff α• ∨ β∗ and γ∗,N,u do not fit into the context {}, ∗}, because (α• ∨ β∗)∗,} and γ∗,N,u,∗,} are not
wff and, therefore, cannot be in F n. There is no wff that fits into the context {∗}, because the label ∗ ∈ Lw
and the rule of labelling can only include the resulting formula into Fw. We can conclude that if a wff is in
F n, then the context must be in Cw and the same for Fw and Cn. The fitting restriction ensures that the
conclusion of a rule is always a wff.
Moreover, the definition of fitting resembles the attribute grammar approach for context free languages
[5]. This is the main reason to name the stack of labels of a formula as the attribute of the formula.
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Π
∆
αΣ ∧ βΩ
1: ∆
αΣ
Π
∆
αΣ ∧ βΩ
2: ∆
βΩ
Π1
∆
αΣ
Π2
∆
βΩ
3: ∆
αΣ ∧ βΩ
Π
∆
αΣ
4: ∆
αΣ ∨ βΩ
Π1
∆
αΣ ∨ βΩ
[αΣ]
∆
Π2
Θ
γΛ
[βΩ]
∆
Π3
Θ
γΛ
5: Θ
γΛ
Π
∆
βΩ
6: ∆
αΣ ∨ βΩ
[¬(αΣ)]
∆
Π
∆⊥
7: ∆
αΣ
Π
∆⊥
8: ∆
αΣ
Π
∆⊥
9: ⊥n
αΣ
10: ∆
αΣ
[αΣ]
∆
Π
∆
βΩ
11: ∆
αΣ → βΩ
Π1
∆
αΣ
Π2
∆
αΣ → βΩ
12: ∆
βΩ
Π
∆
αΣ,φ
13: ∆, φ
αΣ
Π ∆, φ
αΣ
14: ∆
αΣ,φ
Π ∆, u
αΣ
15: ∆, ∗
αΣ
Π ∆, ∗
αΣ
16: ∆, u
αΣ
Π ∆, u
αΣ
17: ∆, •
αΣ
Π1 ∆, •
αΣ
[αΣ]
∆, u
Π2
Θ
βΩ
18: Θ
βΩ
Π1 ∆, N
αΣ
Π2 ∆,}
βΩ
19: ∆,}
αΣ
Π1 ∆,}
αΣ
[αΣ]
∆, N
Π2
Θ
βΩ
20: Θ
βΩ
Π ∆, N
αΣ
21: ∆,~
αΣ
Π1 ∆,~
αΣ
Π2 ∆, N
βΩ
22: ∆, N
αΣ
Π1 ∆, N
αΣ,•
Π2 ∆,MˆN
23: ∆,M
αΣ,•
Π1 ∆, N
αΣ,∗
Π2 ∆,M´N
24: ∆,M
αΣ,∗
Π1 ∆, NˆM
Π2 ∆,MˆP
25: ∆, NˆP
Π1 ∆, N´M
Π2 ∆,M´P
26: ∆, N´P
[ˆM ]
∆, N
Π1
Θ
αΣ
[ˆN ]
∆,M
Π2
Θ
αΣ
27: Θ
αΣ
[´M ]
∆, N
Π1
Θ
αΣ
[´N ]
∆,M
Π2
Θ
αΣ
28: Θ
αΣ
[ˆN ]
∆,M
Π1
Θ
αΣ
[´N ]
∆,M
Π2
Θ
αΣ
29: Θ
αΣ
30: ∆>
Figure 2: Natural Deduction System for PUC-Logic (PUC-ND)
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Here it follows the names and restrictions of the rules of PUC-ND:
1. ∧-elimination: (a) αΣ and βΩ must fit into the context; (b) ∆ has no existential quantifier;
The existential quantifier is excluded to make it possible to distribute the context over the ∧ operator,
what is shown in lemma 8.
2. ∧-elimination: (a) αΣ and βΩ must fit into the context; (b) ∆ has no existential quantifier;
The existential quantifier is excluded to make it possible to distribute the context over the ∧ operator,
what is shown in lemma 8.
3. ∧-introduction: (a) αΣ and βΩ must fit into the context; (b) ∆ has no existential quantifier;
The existential quantifier is excluded because the existence of some world (or neighbourhood) in which
some wff A holds and the existence of some world in which B holds do not implies that there is some
world in which A and B holds.
4. ∨-introduction: (a) αΣ and βΩ must fit into the context; (b) ∆ has no universal quantifier;
The universal quantifier is excluded to make it possible to distribute the context over the ∨ operator,
what is shown in lemma 8.
5. ∨-elimination: (a) αΣ and βΩ must fit into the context ∆; (b) ∆ has no universal quantifier; The
universal quantifier is excluded because the fact that for all worlds (or neighbourhoods) A ∨ B holds
does not implies that for all worlds A holds or for all worlds B holds.
6. ∨-introduction: (a) αΣ and βΩ must fit into the context; (b) ∆ has no universal quantifier;
The universal quantifier is excluded to make it possible to distribute the context over the ∨ operator,
what is shown in lemma 8.
7. ⊥-classical: (a) αΣ and ⊥ must fit into the context;
8. ⊥-intuitionistic: (a) αΣ and ⊥ must fit into the context;
9. absurd expansion: (a) ∆ must have no occurrence of ~; (b) ⊥ must fit into the context; (c) ∆ must
be non empty.
The symbol ⊥ is used to denote a formula that may only be ⊥n or ⊥w. In the occurrence of ~, we
admit the possibility of an empty system of neighbourhoods. In that context, the absurd does not
mean that we actually reach an absurd in our world. ∆ must be non empty to avoid unnecessary
detours, like the conclusion of ⊥n from ⊥n in the empty context;
10. hypothesis-injection: (a) αΣ must fit into the context.
This rule permits an scope change before any formula change. It also avoids combinatorial definitions
of rules with hypothesis and formulas inside a given context;
11. →-introduction: (a) αΣ and βΩ must fit into the context;
12. →-elimination (modus ponens): (a) αΣ and βΩ must fit into the context; (b) ∆ has no existential
quantifier; (c) the premises may be in reverse order;
The existential quantifier is excluded because the existence of some world (or neighbourhood) in which
some wff A holds and the existence of some world in which A→ B holds do not implies that there is
some world in which B holds.
13. context-introduction: (a) αΣ,φ and αΣ must fit into their contexts;
14. context-elimination: (a) αΣ,φ and αΣ must fit into their contexts;
15. world universal introduction: (a) αΣ must fit into the context; (b) u must not occur in any
hypothesis on which αΣ depends; (c) u must not occur in the context of any hypothesis on which αΣ
depends;
10
16. world universal elimination: (a) αΣ must fit into the context; (b) u must not occur in αΣ or ∆;
17. world existential introduction: (a) αΣ must fit into the context;
18. world existential elimination: (a) the formula αΣ must fit into the context; (b) u must not occur
in αΣ, ∆, Θ or any open hypothesis on which βΩ depends; (c) u must not occur in the context of any
open hypothesis on which βΩ depends; (d) the premises may be in reverse order;
19. neighbourhood existential introduction: (a) αΣ must fit into the context; (b) the premises may
be in reverse order;
20. neighbourhood existential elimination: (a) the formula αΣ must fit into the context; (b) N must
not occur in αΣ, ∆, Θ or any open hypothesis on which βΩ depends; (c) N must not occur in the
context of any open hypothesis on which βΩ depends; (d) the premises may be in reverse order;
21. neighbourhood universal introduction: (a) the formula αΣ must fit into the contexts; (b) N must
not occur in any open hypothesis on which αΣ depends; (c) N must not occur in the context of any
open hypothesis on which αΣ depends;
22. neighbourhood universal wild-card: (a) the formulas αΣ and βΩ must fit into their contexts; (b)
the premises may be in reverse order;
This rule is necessary, because a system of neighbourhood may be empty and every variable must
denote some neighbourhood because of the variable assignment function σ. The wild-card rule may be
seen as a permition to use some available variable as an instantiation, by making explicit the choice
of the variable.
23. world existential propagation: (a) αΣ,• and ˆN fit into their contexts; (b) the premises may be in
reverse order;
24. world universal propagation: (a) αΣ,∗ and ´N fit into their contexts; (b) the premises may be in
reverse order;
25. transitive neighbourhood inclusion: (a) ˆM and ˆP fit into their contexts; (b) the premises may
be in reverse order;
26. transitive neighbourhood inclusion: (a) ´M and ´P fit into their contexts; (b) the premises may
be in reverse order;
27. neighbourhood total order: (a) ˆM , ˆN and αΣ fit into their contexts; (b) the premises may be
in reverse order;
28. neighbourhood total order: (a) ´M , ´N and αΣ fit into their contexts; (b) the premises may be
in reverse order;
29. neighbourhood total order: (a) ˆN , ´N and αΣ fit into their contexts. (b) the premises may be
in reverse order;
30. truth acceptance: (a) ∆ must have no occurrence of }; (b) > must fit into the context. The symbol
> is used to denote a formula that may only be >n or >w. If we accepted the occurrence of }, the
existence of some neighbourhood in every system of neighbourhoods would be necessary and the logic
of PUC-ND should be normal according to Lewis classification [1]. ∆ must be non empty to avoid
unnecessary detours, like the conclusion of >n from >n in the empty context.
We present here, as an example of the PUC-ND inference calculus, a proof of a tautology. Considering
Lewis definitions, we understand that if there is some neighbourhood that has some βΩ-world but no αΣ-
world, then, for all neighbourhoods, having some αΣ-world implies having some βΩ-world. The reason is
the total order for the inclusion relation among neighbourhoods.
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4[(¬(αΣ))∗ ∧ βΩ,•)}]
(¬(αΣ))∗ ∧ βΩ,•)} }
(¬(αΣ))∗ ∧ βΩ,•
3[(¬(αΣ))∗ ∧ βΩ,•]
N
Π
(αΣ,• → βΩ,•)~
3
(αΣ,• → βΩ,•)~
4
((¬(αΣ))∗ ∧ βΩ,•)} → (αΣ,• → βΩ,•)~
(¬(αΣ))∗ ∧ βΩ,•
N
(¬(αΣ))∗ ∧ βΩ,•
N
βΩ,•
2[ˆN ]
MˆN
M
βΩ,•
M
αΣ,• → βΩ,•
(¬(αΣ))∗ ∧ βΩ,•
N
(¬(αΣ))∗ ∧ βΩ,•
N
(¬(αΣ))∗
2[´N ]
M´N
M
(¬(αΣ))∗
M, ∗
¬(αΣ)
M,u
¬(αΣ)
1[αΣ,•]
M
αΣ,•
M, •
αΣ
M,u
αΣ
M,u⊥
M,u
βΩ
M, •
βΩ
M
βΩ,•
1 M
αΣ,• → βΩ,•
2 M
αΣ,• → βΩ,• ~
αΣ,• → βΩ,•
Π
(αΣ,• → βΩ,•)~
Lemma 2. If ∆ ∈ Cn, then s(∆) is odd. If ∆ ∈ Cw, then s(∆) is even.
Proof. By definition, if ∆ is empty, then ∆ ∈ Cw and s(∆) is even. According to the rules of the PUC-ND,
if ∆ is empty, it can only accept an additional label φ ∈ Ln, then {∆, φ} ∈ Cn and s(∆) is odd. We
conclude that changing the context from Cw to Cn and vice-versa always involves adding one to the size of
the label and the even sizes are only and always for contexts in Cw.
4. PUC Soundness and Completeness
For the proof of soundness of PUC-Logic, we prove that the PUC-ND derivations preserves the relation
of resolution, which is a relation that generalizes the satisfability relation. To do so, we need to prove some
lemmas. In many cases we use the definition 16 of the referential consequence relation.
Definition 18. Given a modelM, a context ∆ and a wff αΣ, the relationM |=∆ αΣ of resolution is defined
iff αΣ fits into the context ∆ andM |= αΣ,∆. If Γ ⊂ F n or Γ ⊂ Fw, thenM |=∆ Γ if the resolution relation
holds for every formula of Γ.
Lemma 3. Given a model M = 〈W, $,V, χ〉, if M |=∆ αΣ and αΣ |=M:s(∆) βΩ, then M |=∆ βΩ.
Proof. If ∆ is empty (s(∆) = 0), the resolution gives us M |= αΣ. From αΣ |=M:0 βΩ we know that
M |= βΩ if M |= αΣ and, by the definition of resolution, M |=∆ βΩ;
If ∆ = {~} (s(∆) = 1), then, by definition, M |={~} αΣ means M |= αΣ,~ and for every template T , such
that M( T , T |= αΣ.
〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= αΣ,~
◦
◦
◦
〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ . . . 〈W, $,V, χ, S〉 |= αΣ
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N, . . . , S represent all neighbourhoods of $(χ). From s({~}) = 1, we know that αΣ |=M:1 βΩ and, by
definition, we can change αΣ by βΩ in all endpoints of the directed graph and conclude 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= βΩ,~
and M |=∆ βΩ;
If ∆ = {}} (s(∆) = 1), then M |= αΣ,}.
〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= αΣ,}
◦
◦
◦
〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ . . . 〈W, $,V, χ, S〉 |= αΣ
N, . . . , S represent all neighbourhoods of $(χ) such that αΣ holds. We know that there is at least one of such
neighbourhoods. From αΣ |=M:1 βΩ, we can change αΣ by βΩ in all endpoints and conclude M |= βΩ,}
because we know that there is at least one of such downward paths. By definition, M |=∆ βΩ;
If ∆ = {N} (s(∆) = 1), then M |= αΣ,N .
〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= αΣ,N
◦
〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= αΣ
From αΣ |=M:1 βΩ, we change αΣ by βΩ in the endpoint and concludeM |= βΩ,N . By definition,M |=∆ βΩ;
If ∆ = {~, ∗} (s(∆) = 2), then M |= αΣ,∗,~.
〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= αΣ,∗,~
◦ ◦
〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ,∗
◦ ◦
. . . 〈W, $,V, χ, S〉 |= αΣ,∗
◦〈W, $,V, λ1〉 |= αΣ . . . 〈W, $,V, λt〉 |= αΣ . . .
N, . . . , S represent all neighbourhoods of $(χ). λ1, . . . , λt represent all worlds of N . From α
Σ |=M:2 βΩ, we
can change αΣ by βΩ in all endpoints and conclude M |= βΩ,∗,~. By definition, M |=∆ βΩ;
If ∆ = {~, •} (s(∆) = 2), then M |= αΣ,•,~.
〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= αΣ,•,~
◦ ◦
〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ,•
◦ ◦
. . . 〈W, $,V, χ, S〉 |= αΣ,•
◦〈W, $,V, λ1〉 |= αΣ . . . 〈W, $,V, λt〉 |= αΣ . . .
N, . . . , S represent all neighbourhoods of $(χ). λ1, . . . , λt represent all worlds of N in which α
Σ holds. We
know that there is at least one of these worlds. From αΣ |=M:2 βΩ, we can change αΣ by βΩ in all endpoints
and conclude M |= βΩ,•,~ and M |=∆ βΩ;
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If ∆ = {~, u} (s(∆) = 2), then M |= αΣ,u,~.
〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= αΣ,u,~
◦ ◦
〈W, $,V, χ,N1〉 |= αΣ,u
◦
. . . 〈W, $,V, χ,Ns〉 |= αΣ,u
◦
〈W, $,V, σ(u)〉 |= αΣ
N, . . . , S represent all neighbourhoods of $(χ). From αΣ |=M:2 βΩ, we can change αΣ by βΩ in the endpoint
and conclude M |= βΩ,u,~. So, by definition, M |=∆ βΩ;
Any combination of labels follows, by analogy, the same arguments for each label presented above.
Lemma 4. Given a model M = 〈W, $,V, χ〉, if M |=∆ αΣ and αΣ |= βΩ, then M |=∆ βΩ.
Proof. We follow the argument of lemma 3, by changing αΣ by βΩ in all endpoints, what is possible by the
definition of logical consequence.
Lemma 5. Given ∆ without universal quantifiers, if αΣ,∆ ∨ βΩ,∆ is wff, then αΣ,∆ ∨ βΩ,∆ ≡ (αΣ ∨ βΩ)∆.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the size of ∆:
If ∆ is empty, then equivalence is true;
(base) If ∆ contains only one label, it must be a neighbourhood label:
- αΣ,} ∨ βΩ,} may be read as ∃N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ or ∃M ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,M〉 |= βΩ.
But ∃N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ implies, by definition, ∃N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ ∨ βΩ.
Then we have ∃N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ ∨ βΩ or ∃M ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,M〉 |= αΣ ∨ βΩ.
Since the neighbourhood variables are bound, we have ∃N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ ∨ βΩ, which
is represented whit labels as (αΣ ∨ βΩ)}. Then αΣ,} ∨ βΩ,} implies (αΣ ∨ βΩ)}. On the other hand,
(αΣ ∨ βΩ)} may be read as ∃N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ ∨ βΩ, which means, by definition, ∃N ∈
$(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ or 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= βΩ. In the first case, ∃N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |=
αΣ, which may be read as αΣ,}. In the second case, ∃N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= βΩ, which may be
read as βΩ,}. Since we have one or the other case, we have αΣ,}∨βΩ,}. So, (αΣ∨βΩ)} ≡ αΣ,}∨βΩ,};
- αΣ,N ∨ βΩ,N may be read as σ(N) ∈ $(χ) and 〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= αΣ or σ(N) ∈ $(χ) and
〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= βΩ. Then we have σ(N) ∈ $(χ) and (〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= αΣ or 〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |=
βΩ), which is, by definition, 〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= αΣ ∨ βΩ. Then αΣ,N ∨ βΩ,N implies (αΣ ∨ βΩ)N .
On the other hand, (αΣ ∨βΩ)N may be read as σ(N) ∈ $(χ) and 〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= αΣ ∨βΩ, which
means, by definition, σ(N) ∈ $(χ) and ( 〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= αΣ or 〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= βΩ ). So,
we have (σ(N) ∈ $(χ) and 〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= αΣ) or (σ(N) ∈ $(χ) and 〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= βΩ),
which may be read as αΣ,N ∨ βΩ,N . So, (αΣ ∨ βΩ)N ≡ αΣ,N ∨ βΩ,N ;
(base) If ∆ contains two labels, it may be {}, •}, {N, •}, {}, u} or {N, u}. But we just need to look at the
distributivity for the • label and for world variables, because we have already seen the distributivity of the
∨ connective for the label } and for any neighbourhood variable.
- αΣ,•,} ∨ βΩ,•,} may be read as ∃N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ,• or ∃M ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,M〉 |=
βΩ,•. But 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ,• implies, by definition, ∃w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= αΣ, which implies
∃w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= αΣ ∨ βΩ. So, we have ∃N ∈ $(χ) : ∃w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= αΣ ∨ βΩ or
∃M ∈ $(χ) : ∃z ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, z〉 |= αΣ ∨ βΩ. Since every variable is bound, we have ∃N ∈ $(χ) :
∃w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= αΣ ∨ βΩ, which is, by definition, equivalent to ∃N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |=
(αΣ ∨ βΩ)•, which is equivalent, by definition, to (αΣ ∨ βΩ)•,}. On the other hand, (αΣ ∨ βΩ)•,} may
be read as ∃N ∈ $(χ) : ∃w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= αΣ ∨ βΩ, which is, by definition, ∃N ∈ $(χ) : ∃w ∈
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N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= αΣ or 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= βΩ, which implies ∃N ∈ $(χ) : ∃w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |=
αΣ or ∃z ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, z〉 |= βΩ, which implies ∃N ∈ $(χ) : ∃w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= αΣ or ∃M ∈
$(χ) : ∃z ∈ M : 〈W, $,V, z〉 |= βΩ, which may be represented with labels as αΣ,•,} ∨ βΩ,•,}. So,
αΣ,•,} ∨ βΩ,•,} ≡ (αΣ ∨ βΩ)•,};
- The proofs of αΣ,•,N ∨ βΩ,•,N ≡ (αΣ ∨ βΩ)•,N , αΣ,u,} ∨ βΩ,u,} ≡ (αΣ ∨ βΩ)u,} and αΣ,u,N ∨ βΩ,u,N ≡
(αΣ ∨ βΩ)u,N are analogous.
(induction) If αΣ∨βΩ ∈ Fw, ∆ = {∆′, φ} and s(∆) = n+1, then !∆ ∈ Ln and αΣ,∆∨βΩ,∆ may be written as
αΣ,φ,∆
′ ∨βΩ,φ,∆′ , where s(∆′) = n. Then, by the induction hypothesis, αΣ,φ,∆′ ∨βΩ,φ,∆′ = (αΣ,φ ∨βΩ,φ)∆′ .
From the base assertions, (αΣ,φ ∨ βΩ,φ)∆′ = ((αΣ ∨ βΩ)φ)∆′ = (αΣ ∨ βΩ)φ,∆′ = (αΣ ∨ βΩ)∆;
(induction) If αΣ∨βΩ ∈ F n and s(∆) = n+2, then !∆ ∈ Lw and αΣ,∆∨βΩ,∆ may be written as αΣ,φ,Θ,∆′ ∨
βΩ,φ,Θ,∆
′
, where s(∆′) = n. Then, by induction hypothesis, αΣ,φ,Θ,∆′ ∨βΩ,φ,Θ,∆′ = (αΣ,φ,Θ ∨βΩ,φ,Θ)∆′ . By
base, (αΣ,φ,Θ ∨ βΩ,φ,Θ)∆′ = ((αΣ ∨ βΩ)φ,Θ)∆′ = (αΣ ∨ βΩ)φ,Θ,∆′ = (αΣ ∨ βΩ)∆.
Lemma 6. Given ∆ without existential quantifiers, if αΣ,∆ ∧ βΩ,∆ is wff, then αΣ,∆ ∧ βΩ,∆ ≡ (αΣ ∧ βΩ)∆.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the size of ∆:
If ∆ is empty, then equivalence is true;
(base) If ∆ contains only one label, it must be a neighbourhood label:
- αΣ,~ ∧ βΩ,~ may be read as ∀N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ and ∀M ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,M〉 |=
βΩ. But then, we may conclude that, for every neighbourhood L ∈ $(χ), 〈W, $,V, χ, L〉 |= αΣ and
〈W, $,V, χ, L〉 |= βΩ, which can be represented with labels, since L is arbitrary, as (αΣ ∧ βΩ)~.
On the other hand, (αΣ ∧ βΩ)~ can be read as ∀N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ ∧ βΩ, which is
equivalent, by definition, to ∀N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ and 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= βΩ. So we
have ∀N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ and ∀N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= βΩ, that is equivalent to
αΣ,~ ∧ βΩ,~;
- αΣ,N ∧ βΩ,N may be read as (σ(N) ∈ $(χ) and 〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= αΣ) and (σ(N) ∈ $(χ) and
〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= βΩ). But then, we may conclude, by definition, that 〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= αΣ
and 〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= βΩ, which can be represented with labels as (αΣ∧βΩ)N . On the other hand,
(αΣ ∧ βΩ)N can be read as σ(N) ∈ $(χ) and 〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= αΣ ∧ βΩ, which is equivalent, by
definition, to σ(N) ∈ $(χ) and 〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= αΣ and 〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= βΩ. So we have
(σ(N) ∈ $(χ) and 〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= αΣ and (σ(N) ∈ $(χ) and 〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= βΩ), that is
equivalent to αΣ,N ∧ βΩ,N ;
(base) If ∆ contains two labels, it may be {~, ∗}, {N, ∗}, {~, u} or {N, u}. But we just need to look at the
distributivity for the ∗ label and for world variables, because we have already seen the distributivity of the
∧ connective for the label ~ and for any neighbourhood variable.
- αΣ,∗,~ ∧βΩ,∗,~ may be read as ∀N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ,∗ and ∀M ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,M〉 |=
βΩ,∗. Then we have, by definition, ∀w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= αΣ and ∀z ∈ M : 〈W, $,V, z〉 |= βΩ. So,
for every world x of every neighbourhood L, 〈W, $,V, x〉 |= αΣ and 〈W, $,V, x〉 |= βΩ. Then we may
conclude, by definition, that 〈W, $,V, x〉 |= αΣ∧βΩ and represent it with labels as (αΣ∧βΩ)∗,~ because
x and L are arbitrary. On the other hand, (αΣ∧βΩ)∗,~ may be read as ∀N ∈ $(χ) : ∀w ∈ N : αΣ∧βΩ,
which implies, by definition, ∀N ∈ $(χ) : ∀w ∈ N : αΣ and also ∀N ∈ $(χ) : ∀w ∈ N : βΩ. So, we
have 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= αΣ,∗,~ and 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= βΩ,∗,~. So, we may conclude, by definition, that
αΣ,∗,~ ∧ βΩ,∗,~;
- The proofs of αΣ,∗,N ∧ βΩ,∗,N ≡ (αΣ ∧ βΩ)∗,N , αΣ,u,~ ∧ βΩ,u,~ ≡ (αΣ ∧ βΩ)u,~ andαΣ,u,N ∧ βΩ,u,N ≡
(αΣ ∧ βΩ)u,N are analogous.
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(induction) If αΣ ∧ βΩ ∈ Fw and s(∆) = n + 1, then !∆ ∈ Ln and αΣ,∆ ∧ βΩ,∆ may be written as
αΣ,φ,∆
′ ∧βΩ,φ,∆′ , where s(∆′) = n. Then, by the induction hypothesis, αΣ,φ,∆′ ∧βΩ,φ,∆′ = (αΣ,φ ∧βΩ,φ)∆′ .
From the base assertions, (αΣ,φ ∧ βΩ,φ)∆′ = ((αΣ ∧ βΩ)φ)∆′ = (αΣ ∧ βΩ)φ,∆′ = (αΣ ∧ βΩ)∆;
(induction) If αΣ∧βΩ ∈ F n and s(∆) = n+2, then !∆ ∈ Lw and αΣ,∆∧βΩ,∆ may be written as αΣ,φ,Θ,∆′ ∧
βΩ,φ,Θ,∆
′
, where s(∆′) = n. Then, by induction hypothesis, αΣ,φ,Θ,∆′ ∧βΩ,φ,Θ,∆′ = (αΣ,φ,Θ ∧βΩ,φ,Θ)∆′ . By
base, (αΣ,φ,Θ ∧ βΩ,φ,Θ)∆′ = ((αΣ ∧ βΩ)φ,Θ)∆′ = (αΣ ∧ βΩ)φ,Θ,∆′ = (αΣ ∧ βΩ)∆.
Lemma 7. Given ∆ without existential quantifiers, if (αΣ → βΩ)∆ is wff, then it implies αΣ,∆ → βΩ,∆.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the size of ∆:
If ∆ is empty, then the implication is true;
(base) If ∆ contains only one label, it must be a neighbourhood label:
- (αΣ → βΩ)~ means, by definition, that ∀N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ → βΩ. Then we know
that ∀N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 6|= αΣ or 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= βΩ. So, if we have ∀N ∈ $(χ) :
〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ, we must have ∀N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= βΩ. In other words, αΣ,~ → βΩ,~;
- (αΣ → βΩ)N means, by definition, that σ(N) ∈ $(χ) and 〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= αΣ → βΩ. Then we
know that σ(N) ∈ $(χ) and (〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 6|= αΣ or 〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= βΩ). So, if we have
〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= αΣ, we must have 〈W, $,V, χ, σ(N)〉 |= βΩ. In other words, αΣ,N → βΩ,N .
(base) If ∆ contains two labels, it may be {~, ∗}, {N, ∗}, {~, u} or {N, u}. But we just need to look at the
distributivity for the ∗ label and for world variables, because we have already seen the distributivity of the
→ connective for the label ~ and for any neighbourhood variable.
- (αΣ → βΩ)∗,~ means, by definition, that ∀N ∈ $(χ) : ∀w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= αΣ → βΩ. Then
we know that ∀N ∈ $(χ) : ∀w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 6|= αΣ or 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= βΩ. So, if we have
∀N ∈ $(χ) : ∀w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= αΣ, we must have ∀N ∈ $(χ) : ∀w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= βΩ. In
other words, αΣ,∗,~ → βΩ,∗,~;
- The proofs of (αΣ → βΩ)∗,N , (αΣ → βΩ)u,~ and (αΣ → βΩ)u,N are analogous.
(induction) If αΣ → βΩ ∈ Fw and s(∆) = n + 1, then !∆ ∈ Ln and αΣ,∆ → βΩ,∆ may be written as
αΣ,φ,∆
′ → βΩ,φ,∆′ , where s(∆′) = n. Then, by the induction hypothesis, αΣ,φ,∆′ → βΩ,φ,∆′ = (αΣ,φ →
βΩ,φ)∆
′
. From the base assertions, (αΣ,φ → βΩ,φ)∆′ = ((αΣ → βΩ)φ)∆′ = (αΣ → βΩ)φ,∆′ = (αΣ → βΩ)∆;
(induction) If αΣ → βΩ ∈ F n and s(∆) = n + 2, then !∆ ∈ Lw and αΣ,∆ → βΩ,∆ may be written as
αΣ,φ,Θ,∆
′ → βΩ,φ,Θ,∆′ , where s(∆′) = n. Then, by the induction hypothesis, αΣ,φ,Θ,∆′ → βΩ,φ,Θ,∆′ =
(αΣ,φ,Θ → βΩ,φ,Θ)∆′ . By the base, (αΣ,φ,Θ → βΩ,φ,Θ)∆′ = ((αΣ → βΩ)φ,Θ)∆′ = (αΣ → βΩ)φ,Θ,∆′ = (αΣ →
βΩ)∆.
Now we prove one of the main lemmas, in which, from the resolution of the hypothesis, follow the
resolution of the conclusion. We express this property by saying that PUC-ND preserves resolution.
Lemma 8. PUC-ND without the rules 5, 7, 11, 18, 20, 27, 28 and 29 preserves resolution.
Proof. Consider M = 〈W, $,V, χ〉.
1. If M |=∆ αΣ ∧ βΩ, then M |= (αΣ ∧ βΩ)∆, and, by lemma 6, M |= αΣ,∆ ∧ βΩ,∆, which means, by
definition, M |= αΣ,∆ and M |= βΩ,∆. So, we have M |=∆ αΣ;
2. Follow the same argument for rule 1;
3. IfM |=∆ αΣ andM |=∆ βΩ, thenM |= αΣ,∆ andM |= βΩ,∆, then, by definition,M |= αΣ,∆∧βΩ,∆,
then, by lemma 6, M |= (αΣ ∧ βΩ)∆, then, by definition, M |=∆ αΣ ∧ βΩ;
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4. If M |=∆ αΣ, then M |= αΣ,∆, and, by definition, M |= αΣ,∆ ∨ βΩ,∆, then, by lemma 5, M |=
(αΣ ∨ βΩ)∆, and, by definition, M |=∆ αΣ ∨ βΩ;
6. Follow the same argument for rule 4;
8. By definition, there is no template T , such that T |= ⊥w. So, by definition, for every αΣ ∈ Fw,
⊥w |= αΣ and, by lemma 4,M |=∆ αΣ. The same argument holds for ⊥n considering formulas in F n;
9. If ∆ = {}}, thenM |=∆ ⊥w means 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= ⊥}w . This means that ∃N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |=
⊥w, but, by definition, @N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= ⊥w, so 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= ¬(⊥}w). Then, by the rule
3, 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= ⊥n and, by definition, M |= ⊥n. The case ∆ = {N} is similar. If ∆ = {}, •}, then
M |=∆ ⊥n means 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= ⊥•,}n . But this means that ∃N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= ⊥•n and
∃w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= ⊥n. But, by definition, @w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= ⊥n, so 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |=
¬(⊥•n). Using rule 3, we conclude that 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= ⊥w and, by a previous case, 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= ⊥n.
The other cases where s(∆) = 2 are similar. If ∆ = {}, •,}}, then M |=∆ ⊥w means 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |=
⊥},•,}w . But this means that ∃N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= ⊥},•w and ∃w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= ⊥}w .
But, by a previous case, it means that ∃w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= ⊥n and 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= ⊥•n.
But, by definition, @w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= ⊥n and 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= ¬(⊥•n). So, using rule 3,
〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= ⊥w. Then ∃N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= ⊥w and 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= ⊥}w . By a
previous case, we conclude that 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= ⊥n. The other cases where s(∆) = 3 are similar.
If ∆ = {}, •,}, •}, then M |=∆ ⊥n means 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= ⊥•,},•,}n . But this means that ∃N ∈
$(χ) : 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= ⊥•,},•n and ∃w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= ⊥•,}n and, by the above arguments,
〈W, $,V, w〉 |= ⊥n. But, by definition, @w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= ⊥n, so 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= ¬(⊥•,},•n )
because of the implication of ⊥n from ⊥•,}n . Using rule 3, we conclude that 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= ⊥w and
〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= ⊥n by a previous argument. The other cases are similar and the general case is treated
by induction on the size of ∆ following the previous arguments;
10. If M |=∆ αΣ, then M |=∆ αΣ;
12. If M |=∆ αΣ → βΩ, then M |= (αΣ → βΩ)∆, then, by lemma 7, M |= αΣ,∆ → βΩ,∆. Then, by
definition, M |= ¬(αΣ,∆) or M |= βΩ,∆. But we know from M |=∆ αΣ that M |= αΣ,∆. So, we can
conclude M |=∆ βΩ;
13. If M |=∆ αΣ,φ, then M |= αΣ,φ,∆. But, {φ,∆} ≡ {∆, φ}, then, by definition, M |=∆,φ αΣ;
14. If M |=∆,φ αΣ, then M |= αΣ,{∆,φ}. But, {∆, φ} ≡ {φ,∆}, and, by definition, M |=∆ αΣ,φ;
15. If M |=∆,u αΣ, then, by the rule 14, M |=∆ αΣ,u. By the fact that αΣ,u ∈ Fw, the fitting relation
and lemma 2, we know that s(∆) is odd. If we take some template T = 〈W, $,V, z,N〉, such that
M (s(∆) T and T |= αΣ,u, we can conclude that N ∈ $(z), σ(u) ∈ N and 〈W, $,V, σ(u)〉 |= αΣ.
The restrictions of the rule assures us that the variable u is arbitrary and we may conclude that
∀w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= αΣ. So, T |= αΣ,∗ and, by definition, αΣ,u |=M:s(∆) αΣ,∗, which means, by
lemma 3, that M |=∆ αΣ,∗ and, by rule 13, M |=∆,∗ αΣ;
16. If M |=∆,∗ αΣ, then, by the rule 14, M |=∆ αΣ,∗. By the fact that αΣ,∗ ∈ Fw, the fitting relation
and lemma 2, we know that s(∆) is odd. If we take some template T = 〈W, $,V, z〉, such that
M (s(∆) T and T |= αΣ,∗, then N ∈ $(z) and ∀w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= αΣ. If we take a variable
u to denote a world of N obeying the restrictions of the rule, then we may conclude that u ∈ N and
〈W, $,V, u〉 |= αΣ. So, T |= αΣ,u and, by definition, αΣ,∗ |=M:s(∆) αΣ,u, which means, by lemma 3,
that M |=∆ αΣ,u and, by rule 13, M |=∆,u αΣ;
17. IfM |=∆,u αΣ, then, by the rule 14,M |=∆ αΣ,u. By the fact that αΣ,u ∈ Fw, the fitting relation and
lemma 2, we know that s(∆) is odd. If we take some template T = 〈W, $,V, z〉, such thatM(s(∆) T
and T |= αΣ,u, then N ∈ $(z), σ(u) ∈ N and 〈W, $,V, σ(u)〉 |= αΣ. Since we denote some world with
the variable u, we know that there is some world in N such that the formula αΣ holds. Then we may
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conclude that ∃w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= αΣ. So, T |= αΣ,• and, by definition, αΣ,u |=M:s(∆) αΣ,•,
which means, by lemma 3, that M |=∆ αΣ,• and, by rule 13, M |=∆,• αΣ;
19. If M |=∆,N αΣ and M |=∆,} βΩ, then, by the rule 14, M |=∆ αΣ,N and M |=∆ βΩ,} and, by
rule 3, M |=∆ αΣ,N ∧ βΩ,}. By the fact that αΣ,N ∧ βΩ,} ∈ F n, the fitting relation and lemma 2,
we know that s(∆) is even. If we take some model H = 〈W, $,V, z〉, such that M (s(∆) H and
H |= αΣ,N ∧ βΩ,}, then from βΩ,} we know that $(z) 6= ∅, σ(N) ∈ $(z) and 〈W, $,V, z, σ(N)〉 |= αΣ.
Since we denote some neighbourhood with the variable N , we know that there is some neighbourhood
in $(z), such that the formula αΣ holds. Then ∃M ∈ $(z) : 〈W, $,V, z,M〉 |= αΣ and H |= αΣ,}. So,
by definition, αΣ,N ∧ βΩ,} |=M:s(∆) αΣ,}, which means, by lemma 3, that M |=∆ αΣ,} and, by rule
13, M |=∆,} αΣ;
21. IfM |=∆,N αΣ, then, by the rule 14,M |=∆ αΣ,N . By the fact that αΣ,N ∈ F n, the fitting relation and
lemma 2, we know that s(∆) is even. If we take some model H = 〈W, $,V, z〉, such that M(s(∆) H
and H |= αΣ,N , then σ(N) ∈ $(z) and 〈W, $,V, z, σ(N)〉 |= αΣ. From the restrictions of the rule,
we know that N is arbitrary, so, ∀M ∈ $(z) : 〈W, $,V, z,M〉 |= αΣ, which means that H |= αΣ,~.
So, by definition, αΣ,N |=M:s(∆) αΣ,~, which means, by lemma 3, that M |=∆ αΣ,~ and, by rule 13,
M |=∆,~ αΣ;
22. If M |=∆,~ αΣ and M |=∆,N βΩ, then, by the rule 14, M |=∆ αΣ,~ and M |=∆ βΩ,N . So, by rule
3, M |=∆ αΣ,~ ∧ βΩ,N . By the fact that αΣ,~ ∧ βΩ,N ∈ F n, the fitting relation and lemma 2, we
know that s(∆) is even. If we take some model H = 〈W, $,V, z〉, such that M (s(∆) H and H |=
αΣ,~ ∧ βΩ,N , then H |= αΣ,~ and H |= βΩ,N . By definition, σ(N) ∈ $(z) and 〈W, $,V, z, σ(N)〉 |= βΩ
and ∀M ∈ $(z) : 〈W, $,V, z,M〉 |= αΣ. So, σ(N) ∈ $(z) and, by the universal quantification,
〈W, $,V, z, σ(N)〉 |= αΣ. This means that H |= αΣ,N and, by definition, αΣ,~ ∧ βΩ,N |=M:s(∆) αΣ,N ,
which means, by lemma 3, that M |=∆ αΣ,N and, by rule 13, M |=∆,N αΣ;
23. If M |=∆,N αΣ,• and M |=∆,M ˆN , then, by the rule 14, M |=∆ αΣ,•,N and M |=∆ (ˆN)M . By
the rule 3, M |=∆ αΣ,•,N ∧ (ˆN)M . By the fact that αΣ,•,N ∧ (ˆN)M ∈ F n, the fitting relation and
lemma 2, we know that s(∆) is even. If we take some model H = 〈W, $,V, z〉, such that M(s(∆) H
and H |= αΣ,•,N ∧ (ˆN)M , then σ(N) ∈ $(z) and ∃w ∈ σ(N) : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= αΣ. From (ˆN)M , we
know that σ(M) ∈ $(z) and σ(N) ⊂ σ(M), then ∃w ∈ σ(M) : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= αΣ. We conclude that
H |= αΣ,•,M and, by definition, αΣ,•,N ∧ (ˆN)M |=M:s(∆) αΣ,•,M , which means, by lemma 3, that
M |=∆ αΣ,•,M and, by rule 13, M |=∆,M αΣ,•;
24. If M |=∆,N αΣ,∗ and M |=∆,M ´N , then, by the rule 14, M |=∆ αΣ,∗,N and M |=∆ (´N)M . By
the rule 3, M |=∆ αΣ,∗,N ∧ (´N)M . By the fact that αΣ,∗,N ∧ (´N)M ∈ F n, the fitting relation and
lemma 2, we know that s(∆) is even. If we take some model H = 〈W, $,V, z〉, such that M(s(∆) H
and H |= αΣ,∗,N ∧ (´N)M , then σ(N) ∈ $(z) and ∀w ∈ σ(N) : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= αΣ. From (´N)M , we
know that σ(M) ∈ $(z) and σ(M) ⊂ σ(N), then ∀w ∈ σ(M) : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= αΣ. We conclude that
H |= αΣ,∗,M and, by definition, αΣ,∗,N ∧ (´N)M |=M:s(∆) αΣ,∗,M , which means, by lemma 3, that
M |=∆ αΣ,∗,M and, by rule 13, M |=∆,M αΣ,∗;
25. If M |=∆,N ˆM and M |=∆,M ˆP , then, by the rule 14, M |=∆ (ˆM)N and M |=∆ (ˆP )M . By
the rule 3, M |=∆ (ˆM)N ∧ (ˆP )M . By the fact that (ˆM)N ∧ (ˆP )M ∈ F n, the fitting relation and
lemma 2, we know that s(∆) is even. If we take some model H = 〈W, $,V, z〉, such that M(s(∆) H
and H |= (ˆM)N ∧ (ˆP )M , then σ(N) ∈ $(z) and σ(M) ⊂ σ(N). From (ˆP )M , we know that
σ(M) ∈ $(z) and σ(P ) ⊂ σ(M), then σ(P ) ⊂ σ(N). We conclude that H |= (ˆP )N and, by definition,
(ˆM)N ∧ (ˆP )M |=M:s(∆) (ˆP )N , which means, by lemma 3, that M |=∆ (ˆP )N and, by rule 13,
M |=∆,N ˆP ;
26. It follows the same argument of rule 25;
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30. According to the satisfaction relation, every model must model >n and every template must model
>w. So, given a model M, if s(∆) is even, then, for every model H, such that M(s(∆) H, H |= >n
and, by lemma 3, M |=∆ >n. The argument for odd s(∆) is analogous.
Lemma 9. Given a context ∆ with no existential label, and a wff αΣ that fits on ∆, then, for any model,
M |=∆ αΣ ∨ ¬(αΣ).
Proof. We proceed by induction on the size of ∆.
If ∆ is empty, then αΣ ∈ F n. αΣ∨¬(αΣ) is a tautology because of the satisfaction relation definition: given
any model M, if M |= αΣ, then M |= αΣ ∨ ¬(αΣ). If M 6|= αΣ, then M |= ¬(αΣ) and M |= αΣ ∨ ¬(αΣ).
(base) If ∆ = {~}, then αΣ ∈ Fw. αΣ ∨¬(αΣ) is a tautology because of the satisfaction relation definition:
given any template T , if T |= αΣ, then T |= αΣ∨¬(αΣ). If T 6|= αΣ, then T |= ¬(αΣ) and T |= αΣ∨¬(αΣ).
Given any modelM = 〈W, $,V, χ〉, then for every template 〈W, $,V, χ,N〉 |= αΣ∨¬(αΣ) and, by definition,
M |= (αΣ ∨ ¬(αΣ))~. So, M |= (αΣ ∨ ¬(αΣ))∆ and, by definition, M |=∆ αΣ ∨ ¬(αΣ).
(base) If ∆ = {N}: by the previous case,M |= (αΣ ∨¬(αΣ))~ and, in particular,M |= (αΣ ∨¬(αΣ))N , for
any neighbourhood variable N .
(base) If ∆ = {~, ∗}, then αΣ ∈ F n. αΣ∨¬(αΣ) is a tautology because of the satisfaction relation definition:
given any modelH, ifH |= αΣ, thenH |= αΣ∨¬(αΣ). IfH 6|= αΣ, thenH |= ¬(αΣ) andH |= αΣ∨¬(αΣ). We
apply lemma 1 to conclude that (αΣ∨¬(αΣ))∗,~ is also a tautology. So, for any modelM |= (αΣ∨¬(αΣ))∗,~
and, by definition, M |=∆ αΣ ∨ ¬(αΣ).
(base) If ∆ = {~, u}: by the previous case (αΣ ∨ ¬(αΣ))∗,~ is a tautology. So, in particular, M |=
(αΣ ∨ ¬(αΣ))u,~ for any world variable and, by definition, M |=∆ αΣ ∨ ¬(αΣ).
(base) If ∆ = {N, ∗} and ∆ = {N, u} are analogous to the previous case.
(induction) If ∆ = {φ,∆′}: by lemma 5, (αΣ ∨ ¬(αΣ))φ,∆′ ≡ (αΣ,φ ∨ (¬(αΣ)φ)∆′ . By the induction
hypothesis, M |=∆′ αΣ,φ ∨ (¬(αΣ))φ. By lemma 5 again, M |=∆′ (αΣ ∨ (¬(αΣ))φ and, by definition,
M |=∆′,φ αΣ ∨ ¬(αΣ).
Lemma 10. PUC-ND preserves resolution.
Proof. We present the proof for each remaining rule of the PUC-ND inside an induction. Base argument:
5. If M |=∆ αΣ ∨ βΩ, then M |= (αΣ ∨ βΩ)∆, then, by lemma 5, M |= αΣ,∆ ∨ βΩ,∆, then, by definition,
M |= αΣ,∆ or M |= βΩ,∆. This means, by definition, that M |=∆ αΣ or M |=∆ βΩ. So, if Π1 and
Π2 only contains the rules from lemma 8, M |=Θ γΛ in both cases, because of the preservation of
the resolution relation. And, for that conclusion, the hypothesis are no longer necessary and may be
discharged;
7. We know from classical logic that M |= αΣ,∆ ∨ ¬(αΣ,∆), which means that M |= αΣ,∆ or M |=
¬(αΣ,∆). In the first case, we know thatM |=∆ αΣ. In the second case, we know thatM |=∆ ¬(αΣ).
If the subderivation Π only contains the rules from lemma 8, we can conclude that M |=∆ ⊥. But,
from rule 7, this means that M |=∆ αΣ. So, in either case, we can conclude M |=∆ αΣ and we are
able to discharge the hypothesis;
11. From lemma 9, we know that M |=∆ αΣ ∨ ¬(αΣ), so M |=∆ αΣ or M |=∆ ¬(αΣ). In the first
case, if Π only contains the rules of lemma 8, then the derivation gives us M |=∆ βΩ. If βΩ ∈
F n, then, by the fitting relation and lemma 2, we know that s(∆) is even. If we take some model
H = 〈W, $,V, z〉, such that M (s(∆) H and H |= βΩ, then, by definition, H |= αΣ → βΩ. So, by
definition, βΩ |=M:s(∆) αΣ → βΩ, which means, by lemma 3, that M |=∆ αΣ → βΩ. If βΩ ∈ Fw,
then, by the fitting relation and lemma 2, we know that s(∆) is odd. If we take some template
T = 〈W, $,V, z, L〉, such that M (s(∆) T and T |= βΩ, then, by definition, T |= αΣ → βΩ. So,
by definition, βΩ |=M:s(∆) αΣ → βΩ, which means, by lemma 3, that M |=∆ αΣ → βΩ. In the case
where M |=∆ ¬(αΣ), if ¬(αΣ) ∈ F n, then, by the fitting relation and lemma 2, we know that s(∆)
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is even. If we take some model H = 〈W, $,V, z〉, such that M (s(∆) H and H |= ¬(αΣ), then, by
definition, H |= αΣ → βΩ. So, by definition, ¬(αΣ) |=M:s(∆) αΣ → βΩ, which means, by lemma 3,
that M |=∆ αΣ → βΩ. If ¬(αΣ) ∈ Fw, then, by the fitting relation and lemma 2, we know that s(∆)
is odd. If we take some template T = 〈W, $,V, z, L〉, such that M (s(∆) T and T |= ¬(αΣ), then,
by definition, T |= αΣ → βΩ. So, by definition, ¬(αΣ) |=M:s(∆) αΣ → βΩ, which means, by lemma 3,
that M |=∆ αΣ → βΩ. So the hypothesis is unnecessary and may be discharged;
18. If M |=∆,• αΣ, then, by the rule 14, M |=∆ αΣ,•. By the fact that αΣ,• ∈ Fw, the fitting relation
and lemma 2, we know that s(∆) is odd. If we take some template T = 〈W, $,V, z,N〉, such that
M (s(∆) T and T |= αΣ,•, then, N ∈ $(z) and ∃w ∈ N : 〈W, $,V, w〉 |= αΣ. Since the variable u
occurs nowhere else in the derivation, u can be taken as a denotation of the given existential and we
conclude that 〈W, $,V, σ(u)〉 |= αΣ, what means that T |= αΣ,u. So, by definition, αΣ,• |=M:s(∆) αΣ,u,
which means, by lemma 3, that M |=∆ αΣ,u. We conclude, using the rule 13, that M |=∆,u αΣ. If
Π only contains rules of the lemma 8, then we can conclude M |=Θ βΩ. Then we can discharge the
hypothesis because we know that any denotation of the existential may provide the same conclusion;
20. IfM |=∆,} αΣ, then, by the rule 14,M |=∆ αΣ,}. By the fact that αΣ,} ∈ F n, the fitting relation and
lemma 2, we know that s(∆) is even. If we take some model H = 〈W, $,V, z〉, such that M(s(∆) H
and H |= αΣ,}, then ∃M ∈ $(z) : 〈W, $,V, z,M〉 |= αΣ. Since the variable N occurs nowhere
else in the derivation, N can be taken as a denotation of the given existential and we conclude that
〈W, $,V, z, σ(N)〉 |= αΣ, what means that H |= αΣ,N . So, by definition, αΣ,} |=M:s(∆) αΣ,N , which
means, by lemma 3, that M |=∆ αΣ,N . We conclude, using the rule 13, that M |=∆,N αΣ. If Π only
contains rules of the lemma 8, then we can concludeM |=Θ βΩ. Then we can discharge the hypothesis
because we know that any denotation of the existential may provide the same conclusion;
27. From rule 14, the fitting relation, and lemma 2, we know that s(∆) is even. If we take some model
H = 〈W, $,V, z〉, such that M (s(∆) H, we know that the neighbourhoods of $(z) are in total
order for the inclusion relation. Given any two neighbourhood variables M and N , we know that
σ(M) ∈ $(z), σ(N) ∈ $(z) and either σ(M) ⊂ σ(N) or σ(N) ⊂ σ(M). This can be expressed by
H |= (ˆN)M ∨ (ˆM)N . By definition, H |= (ˆN)M or H |= (ˆM)N , then, by definition,M |=∆ (ˆN)M
orM |=∆ (ˆM)N and, using rule 13, M |=∆,M ˆN orM |=∆,N ˆM . If the subderivations Π1 and Π2
only contains the rules of lemma 8, then M |=Θ αΣ and the hypothesis may be discharged.
28. Follow the same argument for rule 28.
29. From rule 14, the fitting relation, and lemma 2, we know that s(∆) is even. If we take some model
H = 〈W, $,V, z〉, such that M(s(∆) H, we know that the neighbourhoods of $(z) are in total order
for the inclusion relation. Given a neighbourhood variable M , we know that, for every neighbourhood
variable N , either σ(M) ⊂ σ(N) or σ(N) ⊂ σ(M). This can be expressed by H |= (ˆN)M ∨ (´N)M .
By definition, H |= (ˆN)M or H |= (´N)M , then, by definition,M |=∆ (ˆN)M orM |=∆ (´N)M and,
using rule 13, M |=∆,M ˆN or M |=∆,M ´N . If the subderivations Π1 and Π2 only contains the rules
of lemma 8, then M |=Θ αΣ and the hypothesis may be discharged.
Inductive case: for every rule, we suppose that the subderivations (Π) were only composed by rules of the
lemma 8. If some derivation may contains all rules of the PUC-ND, then there must be an application
of the rules of the present lemma that contains only the rules of the lemma 8, because the derivation is
finite and the subderivations have a positive number of application of rules. Those cases are covered by the
Base argument and, for that reason, they preserve the resolution relation. The next step is to consider all
application of the rules of the present lemma that may have one application of the rules 5, 7, 11, 19, 20, 28, 29
or 30. Then, step by step, we cover all possible nested application of the rules of the present lemma.
Definition 19. Given the formulas αΣ and βΩ, the relation αΣ `∆Θ βΩ of derivability is defined iff there
is a derivation that concludes βΩ in the context Θ and that may only have αΣ in the context ∆ as open
hypothesis. If Γ ⊂ F n or Γ ⊂ Fw, the relation Γ `∆Θ αΣ of derivability is defined iff there is a derivation
20
that concludes αΣ in the context Θ and that only has as open hypothesis the formulas of Γ in the context
∆.
Definition 20. αΣ is a theorem iff ` αΣ.
Theorem 1. Γ ` αΣ implies Γ |= αΣ (Soundness).
Proof. The fitting restriction of the rules of PUC-ND ensures that αΣ ∈ F n because it appears in the
empty context. The same conclusion follows for every formula of Γ. The derivability assures that there is
a derivation that concludes αΣ and takes as open hypothesis a subset of Γ, which we call Γ′. If we take a
modelM that satisfies every formula of Γ, then it also satisfies every formula of Γ′. So, M |= γΘ, for every
γΘ ∈ Γ′. But this means, by definition, that, for every wff of Γ′, the resolution relation holds with the empty
context. Then, from lemma 10, we know that M |= αΣ. So, every model, that satisfies every formula of Γ,
satisfies αΣ and, by definition, Γ |= αΣ.
In order to prove the converse implication, we use maximal consistent sets to prove completeness for the
fragment {∧,→, •,},~} of the language. The label } is not definable from ~ and vice-versa because the
chosen logic for neighbourhoods is a free logic [22]. The reader can see the propositional classic logic case
of this way of proving completeness in [17]. But for the completeness proof we must restrict the formulas to
sentences due to occurrences of variables.
Definition 21. Given αΣ ∈ F n, if αΣ has no variables in the attributes of its subformulas nor any subfor-
mula of the shape ˆN or ´N , then αΣ ∈ Sn. By analogy, we can construct Sw from Fw.
Definition 22. Given Γ ⊂ Sn (Γ ⊂ Sw), we say that Γ is n-inconsistent (w-inconsistent) if Γ ` ⊥n
(Γ `NN ⊥w, where N is a neighbourhood variable that does not occur in Γ) and n-consistent (w-consistent)
if Γ 6` ⊥n (Γ 6`NN ⊥w).
Lemma 11. Given Γ ⊂ Sn (Γ ⊂ Sw), the following three conditions are equivalents:
1. Γ is n-inconsistent;
2. Γ ` φΘ, for any formula φΘ that fits into the empty context;
3. There is at least a formula φΘ, such that Γ ` φΘ and Γ ` φΘ → ⊥n
Proof. 1 ⇒ 2) If Γ ` ⊥n, then there is a derivation D with conclusion ⊥n and hypothesis in Γ. To D we
can add one inference using the rule 8 of PUC-ND to conclude any formula that fits into the empty context.
2 ⇒ 3) Trivial; 3 ⇒ 1) If Γ ` φΘ and Γ ` φΘ → ⊥n, then there is a derivation for each formula with the
hypothesis in Γ. Combining the derivations, we conclude ⊥n using rule 12 of the PUC-ND. There is no
problem with existential quantifiers in the context because we conclude the formulas in the empty context.
So, Γ ` ⊥n. The same holds for Γ ⊂ Sw.
Lemma 12. Given Γ ⊂ Sn (Γ ⊂ Sw), if there is a model (template) that satisfies every formula of Γ, then
Γ is n-consistent (w-consistent).
Proof. If Γ ` ⊥n, then, by theorem 1, Γ |= ⊥n. If there is model that satisfies every formula of Γ, then it
also satisfies ⊥n by the definition of logical consequence. But there is no model that satisfies ⊥n because of
the definition of the truth evaluation function. The same holds for Γ ⊂ Sw.
Lemma 13. Given Γ ⊂ Sn: 1. If Γ ∪ {φΘ → ⊥n} ` ⊥n, then Γ ` φΘ; 2. If Γ ∪ {φΘ} ` ⊥n, then
Γ ` φΘ → ⊥n. Likewise for Γ ⊂ Sw.
Proof. The first (second) assumption implies that there is a derivation D (D′) with hypothesis in Γ∪{φΘ →
⊥n} (Γ ∪ {φΘ}) and conclusion ⊥n. Since ¬(φΘ) ≡ φΘ → ⊥n, we can apply the rule ⊥-classical (→-
introduction) and eliminate all occurrences of φΘ → ⊥n (φΘ) as hypothesis, then we obtain a derivation
with hypothesis in Γ and conclusion φΘ (φΘ → ⊥n). The same argument holds for Γ ⊂ Sw.
21
Lemma 14. Sn and Sw are denumerable.
Proof. Every αΣ ∈ Sn contains a finite number of proposition symbols and logical operators. So, any lexical
order provide a bijection from Sn to the natural numbers. The same argument works for Sw.
Definition 23. Γ ⊂ Sn (Γ ⊂ Sw) is maximally n-consistent (maximally w-consistent) iff Γ is n-consistent
(w-consistent) and it cannot be a proper subset of any other n-consistent (w-consistent) set.
Lemma 15. Every n-consistent (w-consistent) set is subset of a maximally n-consistent (w-consistent) set.
Proof. According to the lemma 14, we may have a list ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . of all wff of Sn. We build a non-decreasing
sequence of sets Γi such that the union is maximally n-consistent.
Γ0 = Γ;
Γk+1 = Γk ∪ {ϕk} if n-consistent, Γk otherwise;
Γˆ =
⋃{Γk | k ≥ 0}.
(a) Γk is n-consistent for all k: by induction; (b) Γˆ is n-consistent: suppose that Γˆ ` ⊥n, then for every
derivation D of ⊥n with hypothesis in Γˆ we have a finite set of hypothesis. By definition, every wff is
included in Γˆ via a set Γk. Then, because the sequence of construction of Γˆ is non-decreasing, there is a
number m, such that Γm contains all hypothesis of D. But Γm is n-consistent and, therefore, cannot derive
⊥n. The same holds for w-consistent sets.
Lemma 16. If Γ is maximally n-consistent (w-consistent) set, then Γ is closed under derivability.
Proof. Suppose that Γ ` ϕΘ and ϕΘ 6∈ Γ. Then Γ ∪ {ϕΘ} must be n-inconsistent by the definition of
maximally n-consistent set. By lemma 13, Γ ` ϕΘ → ⊥n, so Γ is n-inconsistent. The same argument holds
for w-consistent sets.
Lemma 17. If Γ is maximally n-consistent (w-consistent), then:
(a) For all ϕΘ ∈ Sn (∈ Sw), either ϕΘ ∈ Γ or ϕΘ → ⊥n ∈ Γ (ϕΘ → ⊥w);
(b) For all ϕΘ, ψΥ ∈ Sn (∈ Sw), ϕΘ → ψΥ ∈ Γ iff ϕΘ ∈ Γ implies ψΥ ∈ Γ.
Proof. (a) Both ϕΘ and ϕΘ → ⊥n cannot belong to Γ. If Γ ∪ ϕΘ is n-consistent, then, by the definition
of maximally n-consistent set, ϕΘ ∈ Γ. If it is n-inconsistent, then by lemmas 13 and 16, ϕΘ → ⊥n ∈ Γ.
(b) If ϕΘ → ψΥ ∈ Γ and ϕΘ ∈ Γ, then Γ ` ψΥ by →-elimination and, by lemma 16, ψΥ ∈ Γ. In other
way, supposing that ϕΘ ∈ Γ implies ψΥ ∈ Γ, if ϕΘ ∈ Γ, then obviously Γ ` ψΥ and Γ ` ϕΘ → ψΥ by
→-introduction. If ϕΘ 6∈ Γ, then, by the (a) conclusion, ϕΘ → ⊥n ∈ Γ. The conclusion ϕΘ → ψΥ ∈ Γ comes
from a simple derivation with ϕΘ as a discharged hypothesis of a→-introduction that follows an application
of the intuitionistic absurd. The same argument holds for w-consistent sets.
Corollary 1. If Γ is maximally n-consistent (w-consistent), then ϕΘ ∈ Γ iff ϕΘ → ⊥n 6∈ Γ.
Definition 24. Given the maximally n-consistent set Γ ⊂ Sn and the maximally w-consistent set Λ ⊂ Sw,
we say that Γ accepts Λ (Γ ∝ Λ) if αΣ ∈ Λ implies αΣ,} ∈ Γ. If αΣ ∈ Γ implies αΣ,• ∈ Λ, then Λ ∝ Γ.
Definition 25. Given maximally w-consistent sets Γ and Λ, we say that Γ subordinates Λ (Λ @ Γ) iff
αΣ,• ∈ Λ implies αΣ,• ∈ Γ and αΣ,∗ ∈ Γ implies αΣ,∗ ∈ Λ.
Lemma 18. If Γ is n-consistent, then there is a model M, such that M |= αΣ, for every αΣ ∈ Γ.
Proof. By lemma 15, Γ is contained in a maximally n-consistent set Γˆ. We consider every maximally n-
consistent set Ψ as a representation of one world, denoted by χΨ. Every maximally w-consistent set will
be seen as a set of worlds that may be a neighbourhood. We take the set of maximally n-consistent sets as
W. We take ∝ as the nested neighbourhood function $ and @ as the total order among neighbourhoods.
To build the truth evaluation function V, we require, for every maximally n-consistent set Ψ and for every
α atomic: (a) χΨ ∈ V(α) if α ∈ Ψ; (b) χΨ 6∈ V(α) if α 6∈ Ψ. If we take M = 〈W, $,V, χΓˆ〉, then, for every
αΣ ∈ Γˆ, M |= αΣ. We proceed by induction on the structure of αΣ:
(Base) If αΣ is atomic, M |= αΣ iff αΣ ∈ Γˆ, by the definition of V;
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• αΣ = βΩ ∧ γΘ. M |= αΣ iffM |= βΩ andM |= γΘ iff (induction hypothesis) βΩ ∈ Γˆ and γΘ ∈ Γˆ. We
conclude that αΣ ∈ Γˆ by lemma 16. Conversely αΣ ∈ Γˆ iff βΩ ∈ Γˆ and γΘ ∈ Γˆ by lemma 16 and the
rest follows by the induction hypothesis;
• αΣ = βΩ → γΘ. M 6|= αΣ iff M |= βΩ and M 6|= γΘ iff (induction hypothesis) βΩ ∈ Γˆ and γΘ 6∈ Γˆ iff
βΩ → γΘ 6∈ Γˆ by lemma 17;
• αΣ = βΩ,~. If there is no maximally w-consistent set Υ, such that Γˆ ∝ Υ, then $(χ) is empty and for
every βΩ ∈ Fw,M |= βΩ,~. This case occurs iff there is no wff of the form σΦ,} in Γˆ. If there is some
maximally w-consistent set accepted by Γˆ, then M |= βΩ,~ iff, for every maximally w-consistent set
Υ, such that Γˆ ∝ Υ, βΩ ∈ Υ iff (βΩ → ⊥w)} → ⊥n ∈ Γˆ which is verified by the other cases;
• αΣ = βΩ,}. We build a set Υ ⊂ Fw, starting by βΩ ∈ Υ. We take a sequence ϕi of all wff with
the shape of (βΩ ∧ γΘ)} in Γˆ. If, for ϕi = (βΩ ∧ γΘ)}, Υ ∪ {γΘ} is w-consistent, then γΘ ∈ Υ.
To demonstrate that Υ is maximally w-consistent, we suppose that there is a wff σΦ ∈ Fw, such
that σΦ 6∈ Υ and Υ ∪ {σΦ} is w-consistent. Then (βΩ ∧ σΦ)} 6∈ Γˆ by the definition of Υ and, by
lemma 17, (βΩ ∧ σΦ)} → ⊥n ∈ Γˆ. But from βΩ,} ∈ Γˆ and (βΩ ∧ σΦ)} → ⊥n ∈ Γˆ we know that
(βΩ ∧ (σΦ → ⊥w))} ∈ Γˆ, using lemma 16 and the following derivation:
βΩ,}
βΩ,} }
βΩ
βΩ,}
βΩ,} }
βΩ
1[βΩ]
N
βΩ
Π
N
σΦ → ⊥w
N
βΩ ∧ (σΦ → ⊥w) }
βΩ ∧ (σΦ → ⊥w)
(βΩ ∧ (σΦ → ⊥w))}
1
(βΩ ∧ (σΦ → ⊥w))}
βΩ,}
βΩ,}
βΩ
N
βΩ
2[σΦ]
N
σΦ
N
βΩ ∧ σΦ
N
βΩ ∧ σΦ }
βΩ ∧ σΦ
(βΩ ∧ σΦ)}
(βΩ ∧ σΦ)} → ⊥n
(βΩ ∧ σΦ)} → ⊥n
⊥n
⊥Nw
N⊥w
Π 2 N
σΦ → ⊥w
So, by definition, σΦ → ⊥w ∈ Υ and Υ ∪ {σΦ} cannot be w-consistent. We conclude that Υ is
maximally w-consistent and Γˆ ∝ Υ. Υ represents a neighbourhood NΥ ∈ $(χΓˆ). To prove that
M |= βΩ,}, we need to prove that T = 〈W, $,V, χΓˆ, NΥ〉 |= βΩ. We proceed by induction on the
structure of βΩ:
– βΩ = ϕΛ ∧ γΘ. T |= βΩ iff T |= ϕΛ and T |= γΘ iff (induction hypothesis) ϕΛ ∈ Υ and γΘ ∈ Υ.
We conclude that βΩ ∈ Υ by lemma 16. Conversely βΩ ∈ Γˆ iff ϕΛ ∈ Υ and γΘ ∈ Υ by lemma 16
and the rest follows by the induction hypothesis;
– βΩ = ϕΛ → γΘ. T 6|= ϕΛ iff T |= ϕΛ and T 6|= γΘ iff (induction hypothesis) ϕΛ ∈ Γˆ and γΘ 6∈ Υ
iff ϕΛ → γΘ 6∈ Υ by lemma 17;
– βΩ = ϕΛ,•. We build a set Ψ, starting by ϕΛ ∈ Ψ. We take a sequence ϕi in Υ that have the form
(ϕΛ∧γΘ)•. If, for ϕi = (ϕΛ∧γΘ)•, Ψ∪{γΘ} is n-consistent, then γΘ ∈ Υ. To demonstrate that Ψ
23
is maximally n-consistent, we suppose that there is a wff σΦ, such that σΦ 6∈ Ψ and Ψ∪{σΦ} is n-
consistent. Then (ϕΛ∧σΦ)• 6∈ Γˆ by the definition of Ψ and, by lemma 17, (ϕΛ∧σΦ)• → ⊥w ∈ Υ.
But from ϕΛ,• ∈ Υ and (ϕΛ ∧ σΦ)• → ⊥w ∈ Υ we know that (ϕΛ ∧ (σΦ → ⊥n))• ∈ Υ, using
lemma 16 and the following derivation:
βΩ,•
βΩ,• •
βΩ
1[βΩ]
u
βΩ
Π u
σΦ → ⊥n u
βΩ ∧ (σΦ → ⊥n) •
βΩ ∧ (σΦ → ⊥n)
(βΩ ∧ (σΦ → ⊥n))•
1
(βΩ ∧ (σΦ → ⊥n))•
βΩ,•
βΩ,•
1[βΩ]
u
βΩ
2[σΦ]
u
σΦ
u
βΩ ∧ σΦ
u
βΩ ∧ σΦ •
βΩ ∧ σΦ
(βΩ ∧ σΦ)•
(βΩ ∧ σΦ)• → ⊥w
(βΩ ∧ σΦ)• → ⊥w
⊥w
⊥un u⊥n
Π 2 u
σΦ → ⊥n
So, by definition, σΦ → ⊥n ∈ Ψ and Ψ ∪ {σΦ} can not be n-consistent. We conclude that Ψ is
maximally n-consistent and Υ ∝ Ψ. Ψ represents a world χΨ ∈ NΥ. To prove that T |= ϕΛ,•, we
need to prove that 〈W, $,V, χΨ〉 |= ϕΛ using the previous cases.
Corollary 2. Γ 6` αΣ iff there is a model M, such that M |= φΘ, for every φΘ ∈ Γ, and M 6|= αΣ.
Proof. Γ 6` αΣ iff Γ ∪ {αΣ → ⊥n} is n-consistent by lemma 13 and the definition of n-consistent set. By
lemmas 12 and 18, Γ ∪ {αΣ → ⊥n} is n-consistent iff there is a model M, such that M |= φΘ, for every
φΘ ∈ Γ ∪ {αΣ → ⊥n}. It means that M satisfies every formula of Γ and M 6|= αΣ.
Theorem 2. Γ |= αΣ implies Γ ` αΣ (Completeness).
Proof. Γ 6` αΣ implies Γ 6|= αΣ, by the corollary 2 and the definition of logical consequence.
5. Normalization, Decidability, Complexity
We investigate here the normalization of PUC-ND. For the normalization proof, we want to present first
the approach similar to the classical propositional normalization. This case happens for maximum formulas
in derivations with fixed contexts, since the contexts are not defined for propositional logic.
To do so, we investigate a fragment of the presented language, in order to use the Prawitz [8] strategy for
propositional logic normalization, in which he restricted the applications of the classical absurd to atomic
formulas. In the chosen fragment L− we only omit the operator ∨, which may be recovered by the definition
α ∨ β ≡ ¬α→ β. After that result, we present the reductions for the remaining rules.
In every case we follow the van Dalen algorithm for normalizing a derivation, starting form a subderivation
that concludes a maximum formula with maximum rank, what means a maximum formula that has no
maximum formula above it with more connectives in the subderivation.
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Lemma 19. Every derivation that is composed only by the rules 1 to 8 and 10 to 12 is normalizable.
Proof. These rules may be seen as a natural deduction system for the classical propositional logic, since the
context is fixed and the formulas with labels are treated like atomic formulas. We follow the strategy of
Prawitz [8]. We give here the reductions for the propositional logical operators, in the case of fixed context
and labels:
• ∧-reductions:
Π1
∆α
Π2
∆
β
∆
α ∧ β
∆α
∆
Π3

Π1
∆α
∆
Π3
Π1
∆α
Π2
∆
β
∆
α ∧ β
∆
β
∆
Π3

Π2
∆
β
∆
Π3
• →-reduction:
Π1
∆α
[α]
∆
Π2
∆
β
∆
α→ β
∆
β
∆
Π3

Π1
∆α
∆
Π2
∆
β
∆
Π3
The application of the classical absurd may be restricted to atomic formulas only. We change the fol-
lowing derivation according to the principal logical operator of γ. We only present the change procedure for
∧, see [8] for further details.
[¬γ]
∆
Π1
∆⊥
∆γ
∆
Π2
1[α ∧ β]
∆α 2[¬α]
∆⊥
1 ∆
[¬(α ∧ β)]
∆
Π1
∆⊥
2 ∆α
3[α ∧ β]
∆α 4[¬β]
∆⊥
3 ∆
[¬(α ∧ β)]
∆
Π1
∆⊥
4 ∆
β
∆
α ∧ β
∆
Π2
Lemma 20. Given a derivation Π, if we exchange every occurence of a world variable u in Π by a world
variable w that does occurs in Π, then the resulting derivation, which we represent by Π(u | w), is also a
derivation.
Proof. By induction.
Theorem 3. Every derivation is normalizable.
Proof. We present the argument for the introduction of the remaining rules. The introduction of the rule
9 cannot produce maximum formulae, but it may produce detours, considering the rules 7 and 8, if the
considered subderivation (Π2 below) do not discharge any hypothesis of the upper subderivation (Π1 below).
But such detours may be substituted by one application of the rule 8 as shown below:
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Π1
∆⊥
rule 9: ⊥n
Π2
∆⊥
rule 8: ∆
βΩ
∆
Π3

Π2
∆
Π2
∆⊥
rule 8: ∆
βΩ
∆
Π3
[¬(βΩ)]
∆¬(βΩ)
Π1
∆⊥
rule 9: ⊥n
Π2
∆⊥
rule 7: ∆
βΩ
∆
Π3

Π1
∆⊥
rule 8: ∆
βΩ
∆
Π3
The rules 13 and 14 produce a detour only if the conclusion of one is taken as an hypothesis of the other
rule for the same context and, as above, the considered subderivation do not discharge any hypothesis of the
upper subderivation. In this case, if we eliminate such detour, as below, we may produce a new maximum
formula of the case of lemma 19. We cannot produce new detours by doing that elimination because, if
there is any detour surrounding the formula αΣ, it must exist before the elimination. If we start from the up
and left most detour, we eliminate the detours until we produce a derivation that contains only maximum
formulas of the case of lemma 19. The same argument works for the rules 15 and 16 and to the rules 21 and
22.
Π1
∆
αΣ,φ
rule 13: ∆, φ
αΣ
Π2 ∆, φ
αΣ
rule 14: ∆
αΣ,φ
∆
Π3

Π1
∆
αΣ,φ
∆
Π3
Π1 ∆, φ
αΣ
rule 14: ∆
αΣ,φ
∆
Π2
∆
αΣ,φ
rule 13: ∆, φ
αΣ
Π3

Π1 ∆, φ
αΣ ∆, φ
Π3
Π1 ∆, N
αΣ
rule 21: ∆,~
αΣ
∆, N
βΩ
rule 22: ∆, N
αΣ

Π1 ∆, N
αΣ
Π1 ∆,~
αΣ
∆, N
βΩ
rule 22: ∆, N
αΣ
rule 21: ∆,~
αΣ

Π1 ∆,~
αΣ
The introduction of the rules 17 and 19 preserves normalization. These rules produce a detour only
if the conclusion of one is taken as an hypothesis of the other rule for the same context. In this case, if
we eliminate such detour, as below, we may produce a new maximum formula of the case of lemma 19.
We cannot produce new detours by doing that elimination because, if there is any detour surrounding the
formula αΣ, it must exist before the elimination. If we start from the up and left most detour, we eliminate
the detours until we produce a derivation that contains only maximum formulas of the case of lemma 19. We
used the representation (u, v | w, u) for the substitution of all occurrences of the variable u by the variable
w, that do not occur in Π2, Θ or β
Ω, and the subsequent substitution of all occurrences of the variable v by
the variable u. The same argument works for the rules 18 and 20.
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Π1 ∆, N, u
αΣ
rule 17: ∆, N, •
αΣ
[αΣ]
∆, N, v
Π2
Θ
βΩ
rule 19: Θ
βΩ

Π1 ∆, N, u
αΣ ∆, N, u
Π2(u, v | w, u)
Θ(u, v | w, u)
βΩ(u, v | w, u)
Π1 ∆, N, •
αΣ
[αΣ]
∆, N, u
αΣ
rule 17: ∆, N, •
αΣ
Π2
Θ
βΩ
rule 19: Θ
βΩ

Π1 ∆, N, •
αΣ
Π2
Θ
βΩ
The introduction of the rules 23 to 26 may produce no maximum formula but they produce unnecessary
detours. We repeat the above arguments to eliminate them. The reduction for rule 24 is similar to the
reduction for rule 23 and the reductions for rule 26 are similar to the reductions for rule 25. For rules 25 and
26 the reductions depend on the size of the cycles built to recover the same formula in the same context.
We present only the case for a cycle of size 3. The rules 27 to 30 produce no maximum formula nor any
unnecessary detour.
Π1 ∆, N
αΣ,•
Π2 ∆,MˆN
rule 23: ∆,M
αΣ,•
Π3 ∆, NˆM
rule 23: ∆, N
αΣ,• ∆, N
Π4

Π1 ∆, N
αΣ,• ∆, N
Π4
Π1 ∆, NˆM
Π2 ∆,MˆP
rule 25: ∆, NˆP
Π3 ∆, PˆQ
rule 25: ∆, NˆQ
Π4 ∆, QˆM
rule 25: ∆, NˆM ∆, N
Π5

Π1 ∆, NˆM ∆, N
Π5
Definition 26. Given a wff αΣ, the label rank ℵ(αΣ) is the depth of label nesting:
1. ℵ(αΣ) = ℵ(α) + s(Σ)/2;
2. If αΣ = βΩ ∨ γΘ, then ℵ(αΣ) = max(ℵ(βΩ),ℵ(γΘ));
3. If αΣ = βΩ ∧ γΘ, then ℵ(αΣ) = max(ℵ(βΩ),ℵ(γΘ));
4. If αΣ = βΩ → γΘ, then ℵ(αΣ) = max(ℵ(βΩ),ℵ(γΘ));
5. If αΣ = ¬βΩ, then ℵ(αΣ) = ℵ(βΩ);
Remark: by definition, the rank for a wff in F n must be a natural number.
Lemma 21. Given a model M = 〈W, $,V, χ〉 and a αΣ ∈ F n, if ℵ(αΣ) = k, then we only need to verify
the worlds of
a$
~k
(χ) to know if M |= αΣ holds.
Proof. If ℵ(αΣ) = 0, then αΣ is a propositional formula. In this case, we need only to verify that the formula
holds at
a$
~0(χ) = {χ}. If ℵ(αΣ) = k + 1, then it must have a subformula of the form (βΩ)φ, where φ is
a neighbourhood label. In the worst case, we need to verify all neighbourhoods of $(χ) to assure that the
property described by βΩ holds in all of them. βΩ must have a subformula of the form (γΘ)ψ, where ψ is
a world label. In the worst case, we need to verify all worlds of $(χ) to ensure that the property described
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by γΘ holds in all of them. But ℵ(γΘ) = k and, by the induction hypothesis, we need only to verify in the
worlds of
a$
~k
(w), for every w ∈ a$1(χ). So we need, at the worst case, to verify the worlds of a$~k+1(w).
Lemma 22. If M = 〈W, $,V, χ〉 |= αΣ, then there is a finite model M′ = 〈W ′, $′,V ′, χ′〉, such that
M′ |= αΣ.
Proof. In the proof of lemma 18, we verified the pertinence of the formulas in maximally n-consistent sets and
maximally w-consistent sets based on the structure of the given formula to stablish the satisfying relation.
Each existential label required the existence of one neighbourhood or world for the verification of the validity
of a given subformula. The universal label for neighbourhood required no neighbourhood at all. It only
added properties to the neighbourhoods that exist in a given system of neighbourhoods. The procedure is a
demonstration that, for any wff in F n, we only need to gather a finite set of neighbourhoods and worlds.
Theorem 4. PUC-Logic is decidable.
Proof. If 6` αΣ, then it must be possible to find a template that satisfies the negation of the formula. By
the lemma above, there is a finite template that satisfies this negation.
Definition 27. Every label occurrence φ inside a formula αΣ is an index of a subformula βΩ,φ. Every label
occurrence φ has a relative label depth defined by [(φ) = ℵ(αΣ)− ℵ(βΩ,φ).
Lemma 23. Given αΣ ∈ F n, there is a finite modelM = 〈W, $,V, χ〉, such thatM |= αΣ with the following
properties: (a) W = a$~k(χ), where k = ℵ(αΣ); (b) For every world w ∈ a$n(χ), $(w) has at most the same
number of neighbourhoods as labels φ, such that [(φ) = n; (c) Every neighbourhood N ∈ $(w) has at most
the same number of worlds as the labels φ, such that [(φ) = n+ 1/2, plus the number of labels ϕ, such that
[(ϕ) = n.
Proof. (a) From lemmas 22 and 21; (b) Every neighbourhood existential label φ, such that [(φ) = 0 con-
tribute, by the procedure of lemma 18, to one neighbourhood to $(χ) for the model M = 〈W, $,V, χ〉.
The neighbourhood universal requires no additional neighbourhood to $(χ) according to the explanation of
lemma 22. In the worst case, all neighbourhood labels φ, such that [(φ) = 0, are existential. The labels φ,
such that [(φ) = n, n ≥ 0, n ∈ N contributes to the systems of neighbourhoods of the worlds of a$n(χ). In
the worst case, all of this labels contributes to system of neighbourhoods of a single world; (c) The same
argument works for number of worlds in a neighbourhood except that the number of worlds in a neighbour-
hood is bigger than the number worlds in every neighbourhoods it contains. In the worst case, the smallest
neighbourhood contains the same number of worlds as the number of labels φ, such that [(φ) = n+ 1/2. In
this case, we must add at least one world to each neighbourhood that contains the smallest neighbourhood
in the considered system of neighbourhoods. But the number of neighbourhoods is limited by the number of
labels [(φ) = n, n ∈ N. So, the biggest neighbourhood reaches the asserted limit and the number of worlds
of the model is linear in the number of labels.
Theorem 5. The problem of satisfiability is NP -complete for PUC-Logic.
Proof. A wff without labels is a propositional formula, then, by [23], the complexity of the satisfiability
problem for PUC-Logic must be a least NP -complete. Given a wff with labels, by lemma 23, we know that
there is a directed graph, in the manner of lemma 3, that depends on the satisfiability of the endpoints.
Those endpoints are always propositional formulas. So, the complexity of the problem of satisfiability is
the sum of complexities of the problems for each endpoint. It means that the biggest subformula dictates
the complexity because the model of lemma 23 has at most a linear number of worlds and the satisfiability
problem is NP -complete. So, the worst case is the wff without labels.
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6. Counterfactual logics
In [1], Lewis presents many logics for counterfactual reasoning, organized according to some given con-
ditions imposed on the nested neighbourhood function. The most basic logic is V , which has no condition
imposed on $. Lewis presented the axioms and inference rules of V using his comparative possibility operator
(4).
Definition 28. αΣ 4 βΩ ≡ (βΩ,• → αΣ,•)~
Here we prove that the the axioms of the V -logic are theorems and that the inference rules are derived
rules in PUC-Logic. This is proof that the PUC-Logic is complete for the V -logic based on the completeness
proof of completeness given by Lewis[1].
• TRANS axiom: ((α 4 β) ∧ (β 4 γ))→ (α 4 γ);
• CONNEX axiom: (α 4 β) ∨ (β 4 α);
• Comparative Possibility Rule (CPR): If ` α → (β1 ∨ . . . ∨ βn), then ` (β1 4 α) ∨ . . . ∨ (βn 4 α), for
any n ≥ 1.
We present a proof of the CPR rule for n = 2. We omit the attribute representation of the wff denoted
by α, β and γ to simplify the reading of the derivations. We use lemma 24 below for the theorem α→ (β∨γ)
and a derivation Ξ of it.
2[γ•] ~
γ•
1[(β• → α•)~ ∧ (γ• → β•)~]
(β• → α•)~ ∧ (γ• → β•)~
(γ• → β•)~ ~
γ• → β• ~
β•
1[(β• → α•)~ ∧ (γ• → β•)~]
(β• → α•)~ ∧ (γ• → β•)~
(β• → α•)~ ~
β• → α• ~
α•
TRANS 2 ~
γ• → α• ~
(γ• → α•)~
1
((β• → α•)~ ∧ (γ• → β•)~)→ (γ• → α•)~
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1[¬((β• → α•)~ ∨ (α• → β•)~)]
¬((β• → α•)~ ∨ (α• → β•)~)
1[¬((β• → α•)~ ∨ (α• → β•)~)]
¬((β• → α•)~ ∨ (α• → β•)~)
2[β•] ~
β• ~
α• → β•
(α• → β•)~
(β• → α•)~ ∨ (α• → β•)~
⊥n
α•,~ ~
α•
2 ~
β• → α•
(β• → α•)~
(β• → α•)~ ∨ (α• → β•)~
⊥n
CONNEX 1
(β• → α•)~ ∨ (α• → β•)~
1[¬((α• → β•)~ ∨ (α• → γ•)~)]
¬((α• → β•)~ ∨ (α• → γ•)~)
1[¬((α• → β•)~ ∨ (α• → γ•)~)]
¬((α• → β•)~ ∨ (α• → γ•)~)
2[α•]
N
α•
Σ
(α• → β•)~ ∨ (α• → γ•)~
⊥n
β•,N
N
β•
2 N
α• → β• ~
α• → β•
(α• → β•)~
(α• → β•)~ ∨ (α• → γ•)~
⊥n
CPR 1
(α• → β•)~ ∨ (α• → γ•)~
α•
N
α•
Ξ N, u
α→ (β ∨ γ)
Π ~
β• ∨ γ•
3[β•] ~
β• ~
α• → β•
(α• → β•)~
(α• → β•)~ ∨ (α• → γ•)~
3[γ•] ~
γ• ~
α• → γ•
(α• → γ•)~
(α• → β•)~ ∨ (α• → γ•)~
Σ 3
(α• → β•)~ ∨ (α• → γ•)~
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α•
N
α• N, •α
4[α]
N, uα
Ξ N, u
α→ (β ∨ γ)
β ∨ γ
N, •
β ∨ γ ~, •
β ∨ γ
4 ~, •
β ∨ γ ~, •
β ∨ γ
[β] ~, •
β ~
β• ~
β• ∨ γ•
[γ] ~, •γ ~
γ• ~
β• ∨ γ• ~
β• ∨ γ•
Π ~
β• ∨ γ•
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Lemma 24. Given a theorem αΣ, there is a proof of αΣ in the context {N, u}, in which the variables N
and u do not occur in the proof.
Proof. αΣ is a theorem, then, by definition, there is a proof Π without open hypothesis that concludes the
theorem in the empty context. During the proof Π, the smallest context is the empty context. So, if we can
choose variables that do not occur in Π and add the stack of labels {N, u} at the rightmost position of each
context of each rule. We end up with a proof of the theorem in the context {N, u}. This is possible because
there is no restriction that could be applied over the new variables.
We now present some ideas related to the different counterfactual logics Lewis defined, based on condi-
tions imposed to the function $:
• Normality (N): $ is normal iff ∀w ∈ W : $(w) 6= ∅;
• Total reflexivity (T): $ is totally reflexive iff ∀w ∈ W : w ∈ ⋃ $(w);
• Weak centering (W): $ is weakly centered iff ∀w ∈ W : $(w) 6= ∅ and ∀N ∈ ⋃ $(w) : w ∈ N ;
• Centering (C): $ is centered iff ∀w ∈ W : {w} ∈ $(w).
To each condition, corresponds a logic, respectively V N , V T , VW and V C-logics. For each logic, the
PUC-ND may change the set of rules to acquire the corresponding expressivity provided by the conditions.
We present some ideas to make those changes:
V N Rule 9 looses restriction (a). Rule 19 and 22 loose second premiss.
Introduction of the rule:
∆,~
αΣ ∆, N
αΣ
Restriction: (a) αΣ must fit into the contexts;
V T We repeat the system for VN.
Introduction of the rule:
∆,~, ∗
αΣ
∆
αΣ
Restriction: (a) αΣ must fit into the contexts;
VW We repeat the system for VT.
Introduction of the rule:
∆,}, ∗
αΣ
∆
αΣ
Restriction: (a) αΣ must fit into the contexts;
V C We repeat the system for VW.
Introduction of the rule:
∆,~, •
αΣ
∆
αΣ
Restriction: (a) αΣ must fit into the contexts.
7. Related Works
As far as we know, there is only one natural deduction system for the counterfactuals, which is given by
Bonevac [13]. But his system is designed to deal with the VW -logic, since it contains the rule of counterfac-
tual exploitation (E), which encapsulates the weak centering condition. His approach to define rules for
the counterfactual operators provides a better intuition of the counterfactual logic. His systems is expressive
enough to deal with modalities and strict conditionals. The labelling of world shifts using formulas makes
it easier to capture the counterfactual mechanics.
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We also found the work of Sano [14] which pointed out the advantages of using the hybrid formalism for
the counterfactual logic. He presented some axioms and rules for the VHC(@)-logic that extends the V -logic
of Lewis.
We also found a sequent calculus for the V -logic that is given by [25]. But this system also demands
modalities in the syntax. As far as we know, our deduction system is the only one dealing with Lewis
systems in a general form, that is, without using modalities in the syntax.
Conclusions
From the definitions of Lewis [1] for the counterfactual logic, we define our natural deduction system,
which is proven to be sound and complete for the V -logic.
The use of two types of labels (neighbourhood and world labels) gave us the ability to manage different
types of quantifications. The quantifications are largely used by the counterfactual operators definitions
according to Lewis. That approach makes it possible to build the rules for the counterfactual operators as
derived rules of the system.
Another advantage of that approach is that our natural deduction system is built without the use of
modalities or strict conditionals, making it easier to take benefits from the well known propositional results
such as normalization.
References
[1] Lewis, D. K., “Counterfactuals”, Blackwell Publishing, 2008.
[2] Lewis, D. K., “Papers in ethics and social philosophy”, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
[3] Goodman, N., “Fact, Fiction, and Forecast”, 4th Edition, Harvard University Press, 1983.
[4] Bell, J. L., “Toposes and Local Set Theories”, Dover Publications, 2008.
[5] Knuth, D. E., “Semantics of context-free languages”, Mathematical Systems Theory 2 (1968).
[6] Goldblatt, R., “Topoi: The categorical analysis of logic”, Dover, 2006.
[7] Goldblatt, R., “Logics of time and computation”, CSLI lecture notes, 1992.
[8] Prawitz, D., “Natural Deduction: a proof-theoretical study”, Dover, 2006.
[9] do Amaral, F. N. and E. H. Haeusler, “Using the internal logic of a topos to model search spaces for problems”, Logic
Journal of IGPL (2007).
[10] Menezes, P. B. and E. H. Haeusler, “Teoria das Categorias para Cieˆncia da Computac¸a˜o”, Editora Sagra Luzatto, 2006.
[11] Ramsey, F. P., “Philosophical papers”, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
[12] Gent, I. P., “A Sequent- or Tableau-style System for Lewis’s Counterfactual Logic VC”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 369-382, 1992.
[13] Bonevac, D., “Deduction: Introductory Symbolic Logic”, Blackwell, 2003.
[14] Sano, K., “Hybrid counterfactual logics”, Journal of Logic, Language and Information, volume 18, No. 4, pp 515-539,
2009.
[15] Lo´pez-Escobar, E.G.K., “Implicational Logics in Natural Deduction Systems”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 47, No. 1,
pp. 184-186, 1982
[16] Fernandes, R.Q.A., Haeusler, E.H., Pereira, L.C.P.D., “A Natural Deduction System for Counterfactual Logic”, in XVI
Encontro Brasileiro de Lo´gica, Petro´polis, 2011.
[17] Fernandes, R.Q.A., Haeusler, E.H., “A Topos-Theoretic Approach to Counterfactual Logic”, in Fourth Workshop on
Logical and Semantic Frameworks, Bras´ılia, 2009. Pre-proceedings, 2009.
[18] Hansson, B., “An Analysis of some Deontic Logics”, Nouˆs, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 373-398, 1969.
[19] van Dalen, D., “Logic and Structure”, Springer, 2008.
[20] Libkin, L., “Elements of Finite Model Theory”, Springer, 2010.
[21] Troelstra, A. S., Schwichtenberg, H., “Basic Proof Theory”, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
[22] Lambert, K., “Free Logic: selected essays”, Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[23] Cook, S. A., “The complexity of theorem proving procedures”, In 3rd Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Com-
putation, pages 151-158, 1971.
[24] Statman, R., “Intuitioinistic propositional logic is polinomial-space complete”, Journal of Theoretical Computer Science,
vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 67-72, 1979.
[25] Lellmann, B., Pattinson, D., “Sequent Systems for Lewis’ Conditional Logics”, In 13th European Conference on Logics in
Artificial Intelligence, 2012.
33
